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MEANS BY WHICH SURETIES EVALUATE A
CONTRACTOR'S FINANCIAL STABILITY
by Matthew L. Mlekush
There are alarming statistics on the growing number of construction
company failures and the tremendous losses imposed on the public.
This report considers one particular area of construction contracting
that often is a determining factor as to whether a contractor will get
the chance to bid on a project or not. This decision is most often
made by a surety bonding officer. The purpose of this paper is to try
to inform those contemplating getting into construction or those just
starting out, exactly what it is that they will be required to provide
when applying for a bond, and on what basis they and their
corporations will be evaluated during that bonding process. Data for
this paper were compiled by mail survey, by personal interview and
through extensive literature research. The paper includes information
on the preceived needs of sureties and ends with a hypothetical
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Current assets, include cash and those assets which in the normal
course of business will be turned into cash usually within a year from
the date of the balance sheet. Current assets may be looked upon as
consisting of the following six sub groups:
a) Cash
b) Marketable Securities
c) Accounts Receivable-Less Allowance for Doubtful Accounts
d) Inventories
e) Prepaid Expenses
f) Costs in excess of related billings
mm assift»
Included in fixed assets are land, buildings, machinery and office
equipment.
cm—Eli mjumm
Current liabilities include all debts which will fall due in the
coming year. The sub groups making up this category are: accounts
payable, notes payable, accrued expenses payable, and federal income
taxes payable. The current assets are the source from which
payments are made on these debts.
UUML3MB LLilimiEl
Long term liabilities differ from current liabilities in that these
debts are due more than one year from the date of the financial
report. The sub groups making up this category are: deferred income
taxes, and debentures.
MET BMUMI CAPITAL
Net working capital is used synonymously with "net current
assets", and is determined directly from the balance sheet. The net

working capital, is the difference between the "total current assets",
less the "total current liabilities". In other words, working capital,
represents the amount that would be left free and clear if all current
liabilities were paid off. A company's ability to meet obligations,
expand volume and take advantage of opportunities is often
determined by its working capital.
MET Mlfa
With reference to the construction field, net sales are actually
called "operating revenues". They represent the primary source of
money received by the company from its customers for services
rendered.
Operating profit is simply the "operating revenues" less all
operating costs, namely cost of contracts.
WET mm
Net profit is calculated by deducting all costs and expenses from
the "operating revenues". These costs/expenses are composed of:
contract costs, general and administrative costs, interest expenses
and provisions for federal income taxes.
MIPTT MMTM
Net worth is synonymous with the term "stockholders equity". It
includes whatever value is placed on"capital stock" plus earnings
reinvested in the business. In other words, if the company debts
including debts to bond holders, are subtracted from company assets,
what is left should belong "free and clear" to the stock holders, their
equity in the business. Simply
,
net worth is the difference between
total assets and total liabilities.
Current ratio is found by dividing the current assets by the current
liabilities. "This ratio is a rough indication of a firm's ability to
service its current obligations. Generally, the higher the current
VI

ratio, the greater the "cushion" between current obligations and a
firm's ability to pay them. The stronger ratio, reflects a numerical
superiority of current assets over current liabilities" (12). As an
example, should a company's current assets total $350,000 while his
current liabilities total $175,000, his current ratio would be 2.00
which means that for each $1 of current liabilities, there are $2.00 in
current assets available to back it up.
met ajULEHMMIUMl capital ftAIifl
Working capital is a measure of the margin of protection for
current creditors. It reflects the ability to finance current
operations. Relating the level of sales arising from operations, to the
underlying working capital, measures how efficiently working capital
is employed. A low ratio may indicate an inefficient use of working
capital while a very high ratio often signifies overtrading - a
vulnerable position for creditors.
MET BmEJDI M MPT BMUmU CAPITAL
The net profit margin represents the "cushion" available to the
business for carrying receivables and for financing day-to-day
operations. A high ratio indicates the company's ability to use
working capital to generate profit. A high ratio may indicate
liquidity problems and inability to meet current obligations, while a
low ratio may indicate inefficient use of working capital or inability
to produce a profit.
MPT PtofllFflTg Bl MET «AI FS
The net profit is obtained by dividing net profit after taxes, by
annual net sales. This reveals the profits earned per dollar of sales
and therefore measures the efficiency of the operation. Return must
be adequate for the firm to be able to achieve satisfactory profits for
its owners. This ratio is an indicator of the firm's ability to
withstand adverse conditions such as falling prices, rising costs and
declining sales.
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"This ratio expresses the relationship between capital contributed
vii

by creditors and that contributed by owners. It expresses the degree
of protection provided by the owners for the creditors. The higher the
ratio, the greater the risk being assumed by the creditors. A lower
ratio generally indicates greater long term financial safety. A firm
with a low debt/worth ratio usually has greater flexibility to borrow
in the future" (12).
CilHEMI i lAflUJtim to mft BflttXM
The current liability ratio is derived by dividing current liabilities
by net worth. This contrasts the funds that creditors temporarily are
risking with the funds permanently invested by the owners. If the net
worth is small and/or the liabilities are larger, less security is




In 1985 the concepts of business success and business failure are
beginning to acquire almost entirely new meanings. Today, companies
can enter the market and find that in a matter of a few short years,
they are growing as much as or more than established firms who have
been involved in industry and production for decades. As an example,
consider the Apple Computer Corporation. Entering the market in 1981
(1), Apple climbed the success ladder with such aplomb, that in a
matter of only 4 years, they are now listed as *234 in Fortune
Magazine's listing of the top 500 Advancing Industries of the Nation
(2). By the same token, one might also look at United States Steel
Corporation (3). In business for well over 20 years, it has seen a
gradual decline in steel sales since 1984, and has recently closed
steel plants that had been actively producing for years (4).
It seems that the construction industry too has felt the changes that
this new redesigning of success and failure have brought to bear on
the industry . According to the most recently published Dun &
Bradstreet "Business Failure Record for 1983". in 1983, over 5,200
construction businesses failed, leaving over 1 billion dollars in
liabilities that the public was ultimately forced to absorb. Because
the number of failing construction contractors is ever increasing, and
because these failures result in liabilities that the public is
ultimately expected to absorb, this paper will first discuss what

those within the industry and those who have studied the topic in
depth have determined to be the greatest areas of difficulty for these
faltering construction firms.
The purpose of this paper, is to review what factors may be leading
construction companies to failure. Conversely, the focus will also be
on those facts that indicate financial strength and success. The paper
will center on the area of surety bonding, for it is at the bonding
stage that many companies' success abilities or inabilities are
evaluated. It will deal with what bonding agents look for in a
contractor and in a corporation, what carries the most weight in their
evaluation and what kinds of documentation will be required.
It is hoped that the information presented here can be used by those
who are considering entering the construction field, and by those
who are already in the field but are still trying to get all the facts.
With this information a contractor should be able to determine what
is expected by the surety, evaluate whether the company can meet
those expectations, determine what other things might need to be
done before approaching the surety, e.g., finding a banker, getting
together the required financial documents, finding a CPA that can
present the surety with the kinds of information it will require,
choosing an attorney to handle all the legal transactions, etc.
Given the proper information and a chance to evaluate the company
,
a contractor should be able to approach any surety company with




What do bonds actually do and what are their functions? To
answer this question, the fundamentals of bonding (terminology and
types) will be presented.
Functions of Bonds (5)
1
)
"Guarantee that the bonded project will be completed.
2) Guarantee that the laborers, suppliers and subcontractors
will be paid even if the contractor defaults. This often results
in lower prices and expedited deliveries.
3) Relieve the owner from the risk of financial loss arising from
liens filed by unpaid laborers, suppliers and subcontractors.
4) Smooth the transition from construction to permanent financing
by eliminating liens.
5) Reduce the possibility of a contractor diverting funds from the
project.
6) Provide an intermediary —the Surety— to whom the owner can
air complaints and grievances.
7) Lower the cost of construction in some cases by facilitating
the use of competitive bids".
What exactly is a surety bond? This is a three-party contract
entered into by a contractor, the owner awarding the job, and a surety
(responsible for bonding the contractor). In this contract, the
contractor and the surety guarantee the owner that completion of the
construction project awarded to this contractor will indeed take

place. The contract also guarantees that the contractor will meet all
the plans, specifications and construction guidelines that are set
forth in the contract. The surety must guarantee to the owner that the
contractor will perform the required obligations, and that if they are
not performed, that the surety will see to it that it is completed in a
correct and timely manner.
It is by bonding and thus guaranteeing the performance of
contractors, that sureties provide the financial backing that enables
contractors to operate with a minimum amount of risk to those who
both hire them or subcontract with them.
Having a job bonded allows everyone a chance to give their best
prices (as in the case of suppliers) and bids (in the case of sub
contractors), for if a contractor obtains bid, performance and
payment bonds, then all concerned (owners, suppliers and
subcontractors) are guaranteed either completion of the project or
full payment for services rendered or supplies delivered.
Types of Contract Bonds
The following are the three bonds to be described and examined
within this paper.
1 ) A Bid Bond guarantees the sincerity of a bid. If the contractor
fails to meet the conditions laid down in the contract, the bid bond is
forfeited. This will result in a default that generally entitles the
owner to either the difference between the contract bid price and the
next lowest bid price or the penalty of the bond - whichever is less.
To the surety corporation, the execution of a bid bond is of utmost
importance, for once this has been done, the major part of the

surety's underwriting and thorough investigation has been completed.
When a surety issues a bid bond, it sets its mark of approval on the
contractor. That approval has been gained only after that
contractor's records, past history and personnel have all been exposed
to stringent evaluation standards. A surety's bonding of a contractor
says that the contractor has met all the surety's standards, qualifying
it for the surety's financial support and confidence. A bid bond is
terminated when a contract is signed and payment and performance
bonds have been issued.
2) A Performance Bond is issued after a proposal has been
accepted. The performance bond usually has a face value equivalent
to 100% of the contract amount. It is this bond that stipulates that
the work will be completed in accordance with the plans and
specifications. The performance bond is designed to assure the
owner only, that the project will be completed as specified, it does
not guarantee the contractors' creditors payment of unpaid
obligations. Protection for the creditors is covered in the third and
final type of bond - the payment bond.
3) Labor and Material Payment Bonds are usually issued in
conjunction with performance bonds. Generally, each has the same
penalty as the performance bond. The State of Washington requires
that payment bonds be issued for 100% of the contract price unlike the
federal projects in which the face value of the bond is dependent on
the contract amount according to the following schedule (6)
:
Projects under $ 1 million 50% of contract amount
Projects $1 To $5 million 40% of contract amount
Projects Over $5 million least of 40% or $2,500,000

A payment bond guarantees that the contractor will pay all accounts
arising from the job. This allows the owner to take possession of a
lien-free project when all has been completed. For the owner, the
payment bond makes it possible for material suppliers and
subcontractors to provide their goods and services at their lowest
costs. The payment bond makes the contractor, a lower credit risk
than an unbonded contractor. The payment bond also covers the
owners obligation to the community by helping to "ward off" the poor
public relations that might result from the failure of a contractor to
"pay off" local bills. (A sample of each type of bond and bid bond order
form may be found in Appendix B.)
At this time it would be best to explain what exactly a surety
company is and what its functions are. The concept of suretyship is
historically old and well-established. Historically speaking, the
documentation of today, dates the oldest surety contract back to 106
BC (7). That particular contract conditioned the time of payments,
agreeing that half of the payment was to be received at the
securement of the bid and the rest was to be paid at the completion of
the project. By 1356 AD, English law required that any man wishing
to take up a contract, was to come before the owner issuing the
contract with 6 experienced masons who were willing to swear to the
fact that the bidding contractor was capable of doing the job he had
bid on, and, that if he failed to complete the job that they themselves
would complete the projects under the same contracted terms (8).
This is what a surety company does when it bonds a company today.
It, like the masons, guarantees the capability of the bidding
contractor, and guarantees completion of the project. The surety then

has to complete the project if the contractor fails to meet the
contracted conditions.
The first corporate surety was formed in the U.S. in 1876, and
by 1965, there were approximately 150 corporate sureties operating
throughout the nation (9). Most U.S. corporate sureties are insurance
companies, primarily because they (as large financial institutions)
have the capital necessary to enable them to make large commitments
in the form of surety bonds. It would be rather natural to assume that
surety bonds being issued through insurance corporations, would be
much like insurance. This however, is not the case ! A surety is
basically a credit function. While insurance is set up under the
presupposition that losses will occur, sureties are not. They are
rather an "in case of emergency" safeguard. In all actuality, the
surety is more closely related to the banking/credit system than it
is to the insurance system. No self-respecting bondsman ever expects
an issued guarantee to be called in. Although recent years have
proven this supposition false, the surety industry still clings to its
initial premise that suretyship is supposed to be a loss free business.
Unlike insurance, which moves the risk of loss from the customer to
the insurer, suretyship does not involve such a transfer. The revenues
generated from insurance premiums are created with the specific
purpose of being sufficient to cover the losses incurred by all policy
holders. In sureties, instead of a premium revenue fund being the
sole source for the distribution of losses, the underwriters have
"two" separate and distinct accounts from which losses can be
satisfied. The largest and most important fund is referred to as
"resources of the principal on the bond." This is the surety"s

8assessment of the contractors ability to pay. The second is the bond
premium, this is a fee charged by the bonding company for
prequalifying the successful contractor and for lending its credit to
the contractor. The premium consists of a fee that is equal to
approximately ]% of the contract amount, i.e., this is a small fund.
With a clear understanding of these two funds, it is obvious that the
premium fund can never take the place of the larger, it can only
supplement the resources of the principal. It would stand to reason
that no surety underwriter should try to accumulate large amounts in
premium revenues by accepting a large number of substandard risks.
It is understood that surety representatives will be well-versed in
investigating, evaluating and anticipating situations which could lead
to a substantial loss and will apply the necessary corrective
measures to limit the risk.
Primary Functions of a Surety :
1) Prequalification
2) Providing guarantees of Performance and Payment
3) Completion of a project or payment of the bills in the event of a
Contractors inability to do so.
As secondary functions, they:
a) Expedite a project by assuring subcontractors and materials
suppliers of payment or of the credit worthiness of the owner.
b) Keeping contractors out of trouble by refusing to bond
projects that the contractor might be incapable of performing
or in which the risks are too great.
c) Provide management assistance for the contractor.

The surety is set up on the supposition that bonding is to be a no loss
situation. On this premise, a surety issues a bond to a contractor
under its good name, guaranteeing performance and payment. Thus, a
surety must have some means by which to evaluate a contractor
before they will "go on the line" for them.
Sureties compete for bond business just as other industries compete
for the sale and service of their goods. Because of this competition,
sureties have varying underwriting philosophies and evaluation
techniques. "Contractor prequalification methods and judgements
may vary widely depending on the contractors specialty, geographic
area, in-house expertise, financial picture, operational capacity, and
management group" (10). Judgment plays an important role and helps
explain why sureties place varying significance on those areas
considered in the bonding process. Even though the surety business is
not an exact science, it does appear that all sureties acknowledge the
need to do the following: (10)
a) evaluate and verify the financial data of each contractor
b) examine any on going work as well as work previously completed
c) examine contract specifications
d) ensure adequate funding will be available to meet contract
terms
The evaluation procedure mentioned above, is the underwriting
process, commonly known as "surety prequalification". It is through
this process that the surety determines a contractors bondability. The
type of prequalification referred to within this report is "surety
prequalification" and is not to be confused with the more familiar
usage that relates to the prequalification of owners on certain
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projects. One of the major factors derived from the prequalification
process is the bonding capacity" of the contractor. This is
considered to be of utmost importance for it directly effects the
amount of work the contractor may have at any one time. This
capacity is usually reviewed and revised on an annual basis. This will
be looked at in greater detail when the surety responses complied
through the questionnaires are analyzed.
A surety agent is not paid unless a bond is sold, yet, for the
contractor and ultimately for the surety's sake, agents will deny a
bond to those whom they feel are poor risks. If a surety refuses to
bond a contractor, that contractor will usually not be considered a
qualified bidder. One of the primary purposes of prequalification is
the "weeding out" of substandard contractors who may not possess
the necessary backing to see the job through to completion in a timely
and professional manner. A second vital aspect is that it stimulates
greater competition among qualified contractors and increases
competition among material suppliers, subcontractors and bankers.
For these reasons prequalification has the general approval of the
construction industry.
Business Failure Trends
Before prequalification is discussed in greater depth, it is
imperative to recognize its importance. What is it about the
construction contracting field that makes surety companies so
cautious?
According to the most recently published Dun & Bradstreet
"
Business Failures Record for 1983" . over 31,334 businesses failed
in 1983 leaving over 16 billion dollars in liabilities that had to
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absorbed into the economy in some way (10). Of those thirty-one
thousand failed businesses, over five thousand were construction
contract related, carrying with them over one billion of the 16 billion
dollar liabilities previously mentioned. Figures 1-3 give a greater
understanding of these figures. While Figures 1 through 3 do not
directly pertain to the construction field, they do include:
a) The mining and manufacturing industry
b) The wholesale trade industry,
c)The retail trade industry and
d) The commercial service industry.
They are included here, because they give the viewer an overall
appreciation of just how difficult it is to have a lasting successful
business. Figure 1 covers a time period of 24 years, I960 -1983, in
which the percent failure for businesses less than 5 years of age are
plotted with respect to time. It is evident in Figure 1, that on an
average, over 50ft of the businesses which failed, had been in
operation less than 5 years. Firms in this age classification are often
referred to as being "young" or not having a "track record". It is
interesting to note that the year 1981 was the first time the percent
failure dropped below the 50ft range, as was also the case in the
following two years. Obviously, when the percent failure decreases
for young firms, it must be balanced by an increase in the percent
failure for the veteran firms. Figure 2 presents information on the
State of Washington. Here again, total industry failures have been
plotted with respect to time, for the years 1970 and 1980-1983. As
would probably be expected, the "number"of industries which failed,
have tended to increase with time. One graph shows that in 1970
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approximately 300 businesses failed in Washington, while in 1983 the
number of failures had increased to an astonishing 1,222, an increase
of over 400% . It should be emphasized at this point, that one could
develop a distorted picture if they merely looked at the "numbers
game". For a more realistic view, one needs to examine the number of
failures along with the "failure rate". The importance of this is
demonstrated quite effectively by examining the years 1970 and
1980. It would first appear that 1980, associated with 695 industry
failures, was, by far, substantially worse than the year 1970 which
reported only 298 failures. This, however, is not the whole picture
since the failure rate in 1980 was actually lower than in 1970. There
were (77.8/10000 listed concerns as opposed to 85.9/10000 listed
concerns) that year. What is alarming, is noting that in only one year,
1980 to 1981, the rate of failure showed a three-fold increase.
Figure 3 is a further breakdown of the information shown in Figure
2, as it deals with the City of Seattle . Instead of addressing failure
rate as Figure 2 did, it presents information on the total liabilities of
those firms which failed during the reporting year. It is difficult to
imagine that in 1 1 years the total average liability increased from
$13,233,000 in 1973 to $1 17,365,000 in 1983.
These losses are not losses that sureties can afford to absorb, for
in a "no loss" business philosophy, there are no buffers for such
occurrences. Because sureties insist on holding onto their "no loss"
philosophy, they have been forced to become experts in the fields of
analyzing and evaluating each business's probable chances for
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what exactly may lead to the eventual "downfall" of a business.
Sureties have focused on the factors that seem to lead to or have led
to construction contractor failures. (See Table I) Figures 4 through
8 take an in-depth look at the number of failures occurring in the
construction field during the past few decades. They give a better
perspective of when failures are most likely to occur, and the
financial impacts associated with them. Graphs showing the age of
the business and those showing the incurred liabilities are included.
Figure 4 is nationwide in scope and deals with only general building
contractors (no subcontractors included). The construction failures
are plotted against time, in varying increments, and show a rising
number of downfalls. These values should be looked at in conjunction
with the "failure rate" to obtain the true performance of the market.
The first graph of Figure 5 represents much of the information found
in Figure 4, but is broader in nature in that it includes all
construction firms, not solely the general contractors. The second
graph pertains to the "average" liability per failure, and thus gives a
general idea of the economic impact associated with each failure. By
noting the average liability per failure and the total number of
failures occurring during that year, one can determine the total
number of dollars for which the construction industry was liable for
in that particular year. As an example, in 1983 alone there were
5,247 construction failures, each with an average liability of
$295,131 (11). This equates to a total liability of $1,548,554,000
(over 1.5 Billion Dollars). The column graph in Figure 6 presents the
information in a different manner. This figure deals with the

17
CAUSES OF CONSTRUCTION FAILURES— 1982 ft 1983(26)
Construction
(percent)
Underlying Causes Apparent Causes 1982 1983
Neglect 0.2 0.3




Poor Health 0.1 0.3
Marital Difficulties 0.0 0.1
Lack of Experience in the line. 4.4 3.3
Lack of Managerial Experience 8.9 0.2
Unbalanced Experience ** 1 7.5 20.8
Incompetence. 32.3 37.3
Inadequate Sales*** 78.9 83.7
Heavy Operating Expenses*** 21.9 23.0
Evidenced by Receivables Difficulties*** 6.9 6.6
inability to avoid Inventory Difficulties*** 1.2 0.2
conditions which Excessive Fixed Assets*** 2.0 2.0
resulted in: Poor Location*** 0.2 0.0











Reason Unknown 1 0.0 ©.O^01111
** Experience not well rounded in sales, finance and purchasing
*** Since Failures are attributed to a combination of apparent causes, the
totals of these rows exceed 100.0
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percentage the construction industry contributes to the overall
failure picture. During the time frame of 1980-1983 it is noted that
construction accounted for approximately 19.5% of the failures,
nearly one fifth. The failures distribution by sector for the year 1983
have been included in the figure to give a general indication of how
the other industries compared to the construction industry. This
information is shown in the form of a Pie Chart which is also
illustrated in Figure 6. Figures 7 and 8 show identical information
relating the percent failure to the number of years in business for the
years 1982 and 1983 respectively. The statistic of particular note,
is that the percent failure is approximately divided equally among
the three age groups of: less than 5 years, between 6 and 10 years,
and 10 or more years. It was originally thought that companies who
had been in business for 10 years or more would contribute far less
to the percent failure than the ones who had no track record. This
would stem from the fact that the more seasoned companies would
have:
a) learned and acquired the knowledge of how to "weather the storm"
during the down times,
b) have a deep rooted track record which would help in obtaining
financial backing.
c) have both the managerial expertise and the technical backing
required for long term success.
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While the experienced contractor has had the time to cultivate those
areas that only time can aid, those with fewer years of service and
less experience are not quite so lucky. Regretfully, the surety
companies have found that there are a great number of factors that
can bring about the eventual failure of a construction firm, but the
primary cause appears to be poor management. While poor
management in itself is a broad category, it can include the following:
1) overextension; or taking on jobs that the organization is unable to
successfully complete
2) inadequate supervision consisting of incorrectly trained or
inexperienced staff in positions of authority,
3) being unable to keep operations and procedures efficient as well
as keeping up with field advances,
4) inability to maintain correct and efficient cost and accounting
records, a contractor must know the financial condition of the
company at all times, and be able to find, understand and use past
and current job cost data,
5) failure to arrange for proper financing as this requires
forethought, and the ability to anticipate possible or conceivable
problems and be financially prepared to face them and,
6) unwisely entering into hazardous ventures. Evidence suggests
that success is more probable if the contractor stays within a
chosen field of expertise and deals with those the company has




Other problems for the contractor include:
a) the submission of erroneous bids due to the incorrect estimating
of functions ( both mechanical and judgmental)
b) failure to anticipate those contingencies of unforeseen but usual
costs that may have been unexpected or indeterminable
c) failure to allow for the uncontrollable; inflation, material
shortages, wage or price controls
d) leaving an inadequate allowance for overhead and profit
e) other personal problems; marital difficulties, insufficient
insurance coverage for employee protection, or for the
insurance of property or equipment, and the lack of employee
loyalty. (This can really be a big problem for the young contractor
when just starting out).
All these, and more, can lead to operations "getting out of hand" and
the contractor losing control. How does this happen ? The situations
are as varied as the number of cases, but one general scenario is as
follows. A long-time construction worker leaves a long-established
firm to start his own business. This new contractor knows the
building side of things and has untold amounts of experience, but has
had no experience with the managerial side of running a business.
When things start to go awry, he is not able to pick up on the danger
signs, and slowly but surely, "goes under". The same scenario is also
true when the young college graduate gets out of school and starts a
business with a college buddy. Both have adequate "book knowledge",
and the managerial aspects may proceed fairly easily, but neither
have the job site experience/knowledge that is required of a good
construction contractor. Because of the number of problems
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encountered in integrating the two areas of expertise, many
companies end up failing, many, only after they have incurred great
financial loss, and damaged their business reputations.
The failure of a construction firm has different meanings to the
varied groups with whom the contractor is involved. To the owner of
the project, a contractor's failure means, a work stoppage on the
project. To the surety, it means financial loss and added
responsibility to the owner, as the surety then must assume
responsibility for the project and see it to its completion. To the
subcontractors and material suppliers, contractor failure means fear
of receiving no pay for work already rendered, or materials supplied.
There is no one in the construction field that can afford to have a
contractor "go under" while on a job. It is up to a surety bondsman to
see to it that this does not occur, and this is the precise purpose of
underwriting or "prequalification".
Prequalification is the reviewing of a construction contractor, that
is done before the issuance of the bid bond. This prequalifying
investigation is particularly detailed when the bid bond is the first
one being sought by the contractor. It is at this stage, that the
contractor is required to supply itemized financial accounts of the
company, give detailed reports of all previous projects performed,
and is asked to give the goals and direction the company foresees
itself taking in future years. The exact qualifications required by
surety companies are discussed in greater detail as the central focus
of this paper.
Do contractors mind having to meet the requirements of bonding?
It seems that while going through bonding and its searching/probing
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analysis contractors recognize that bonding tends to screen out
unqualified contractors and encourages fundamental fairness in
bidding and award procedures. It should also be noted that
contractors are generally proud and protective of their ability to
obtain bonds and of the bonding credit line extended to them by the
sureties.
. Defaulting Under Bond
Defaulting occurs when the contractor has been awarded the job, but
for some reason is unable to fulfill the contract requirements. One
reason may be the surety's refusal to execute the final bonds due to
the excessively-low bid of the contractor. Should this happen, the
surety and contractor may be called upon to respond to the bid bond
penalty. In Washington, the maximum bid bond penalty is 5% as
compared to the Federal Government which has established 20% as its
bid bond penalty. Usually the penalty is for the difference between
the contractor's bid and the next qualified low bidder, but in no case
shall it exceed the previously mentioned percentages. Defaults of
this nature have been extremely rare and only occur when the job has
been grossly underestimated. Should the contractor be able to prove
that a honest clerical or mathematical error existed, the courts have
held that both bid and bid bond may be canceled.
One example of how such a default might occur when under bond
would be as follows. A contractor has a maximum bonding limit of
one million dollars assessed for a bid bond. The company then
proceeds to bid on a project that comes in at 1.3 million dollars. With
the bonding limit already set at one million dollars, the surety may
justifiably refuse to issue the performance and payment bonds that
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would be necessary for assumption of the bid contract. The surety
may prefer to accept and pay the bid bond penalty rather than run the
risk of allowing the contractor to take the project and then fail.
Economically the bond penalty is usually far more affordable, of
course, the contractor may also be successful in obtaining an
extension of the bonding limit.
Experience has shown that some contractors who have made honest
mistakes hold onto the belief that they are honor bound and have no
alternative but to go ahead with the job. Under such circumstances,
the surety should immediately suggest legal counsel. The unnecessary
performance of any job which is known to have a built-in loss factor
can only lead to serious financial trouble and will preclude the
contractor from bidding on future jobs which have the potential of
making a profit.
It must be remembered that when a surety authorizes a bid bond, the
bondsman has taken into account all the necessary underwriting
factors as though the contractor were the low bidder and the final
bonds now stand approved.
Default Under the Performance Bond
When a contractor experiences difficulty on the job but is still
capable of performing, the surety may very well offer financial
support and/or any other type of guidance that would help the
contractor complete the job. If conditions are such that there is no
possible way for a contractor to meet agreed upon obligations,
default must result. At this point, the surety has four alternatives
which it may pursue under its performance bond. It should be noted,
that these alternatives are based on the principal that, "the Surety
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cannot be compelled to complete the work, for the performance bond
does not obligate itself to "perform" the contractor's obligation, but
rather requires it to "indemnify" the owner against loss resulting
from the contractor's failure to perform"( 1 2).
These four alternatives include (13):
1) "Surety decides to obtain bids and award the job to another
contractor for its completion. In this event, if the cost to complete
the project exceeds the contract price, the bond will absorb the
excess.
2) Surety requests the owner to advertise or call for bids and to
award the work to the lowest qualified bidder. The resulting excess
cost,if any, is the price to complete and the surety reimburses the
owner up to the limit of its bond, which then will represent the loss
to the surety. Most frequently, sureties have exercised this option.
3) Surety decides to have the defaulting contractor complete the
job under the control of its surety claims department by financing and
controlling the funds. This method can be subject to unanticipated
costs as evidenced by the claims experience of many surety
companies, since the maximum loss will be based on the surety's final
cost to complete and not the penalty of the bond. Thus, for example,
in a given case, it is possible for a million dollar contract to cost the
surety twice that amount, or whatever the final costs may be.
4) The decision of the surety to forfeit the penalty of the bond,
rather than permit a loss that would exceed its penalty. Although one
of the factors to be recognized is that a contract bond does not reduce
itself by any payment made between the contractor and the owner.
The surety is always liable for the full amount of the bond, except in
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some cases of suretyship when it is stipulated otherwise. The
election is an infrequent one".
Default Under the Payment Bond
Experience has shown that sureties suffer more losses on payment
bonds than they do on performance bonds since contractors frequently
finish the job but have insufficient funds to pay off the remaining
bills. The surety then has the direct obligation to pay off these bills
up to the amount of the bond, for which it is liable under the federal
and state bond laws.
There are areas of consideration that make up prequalification
guidelines, these come under consideration in underwriting, for during
the underwriting of contract bonds, the surety will be guided by the
Three C's of Credit, namely characters capacity and capital.
Character is of vital importance to both contractors and sureties,
for it is a measure of contractors willingness to stand behind their
obligations. Their reputation in the community must reflect qualities
of honesty and integrity, as well as being upstanding citizens
possessing both good morals and living habits.
The Capacity of the contractor frequently comes up as being the
most difficult of the three C's for the surety to measure. Capacity
pertains not only to possessing the necessary skill and ability to
carry out ones obligation, but includes experience as well as the
education and technical knowledge to enable their companies to carry
their contracts to profitable completion in an economical manner.
While the surety may be able to establish the known character of a
contractor and through a thorough analysis, assess the company's
financial standing, there is no fallible test which will guarantee to

31
the surety what line of credit the bondsman may safely extend to the
contractor. The underwriter's only reference may be in the
contractor's known record of performance and therefore may rely
heavily on personal judgement for a final decision.
The third "C" is Capital which is of primary importance in
determining whether the financial condition of the contractor
warrants the justification of approval for the risk. There are times
when a prospective contractor may not have sufficient financial
backing to attract the interest of the surety without providing
additional support. The contractor may overcome this by personally
indemnifying. By this, the contractor, or perhaps a third party, sign an
agreement by which they become bound to reimburse the surety should
it have to pay the obligee due to a default by the contractor. When
sureties were asked to rank the three C's of credit in order of
importance, character and capacity were overwhelming favorites over
capital. As stated by Mr. Albert Remmen, the equation for the
essentials of credit are: Character + Capacity Capital = Safety in
the Credit Limit. Whereas, under minus factors such as Capital +
Capacity - Character, it becomes an inferior risk. Remmen went on to
say that, "Experience has shown that capacity and capital mean little
when there is a record of dishonesty or when character is doubtful or
strongly inferior^ 14).
One other area of credit which sureties have pointed out as becoming
increasingly important, is what they refer to as the fourth "C", that of
Changing Economic Conditions . Every job that is undertaken by a
contractor is subject to the fluctuations of the economic market
which in turn may have a significant impact on all job costs. The
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sureties have pointed out that particular concerns lie in the areas of
:
a) higher material prices
b) higher interest rates
c) unstable labor conditions and
d) excessive competition (this requires contractors to use a very
"fine pencil" in arriving at their final bids).
It is only by closely examining the 4 C"s that the surety will be in a
position to safely and adequately assess whether the contractor has
the right proportions of each key ingredient needed to insure project




This chapter draws heavily on the Information referenced by the
following numbers In the bibliography. (*1, *10, *16, *17, & *19)
Several times within the body of this paper, the topic of
prequallflcatlon has been mentioned. In this section, prequallflcatlon
will be discussed more fully. When contractors apply for their first
bid bonds, the surety will begin an Intensive "prequallflcatlon
review". It Is In this "review", that contractors' records and business
patterns are examined closely to determine whether they are
sufficiently competent to be bonded.
What records are going to be required for the "prequallflcatlon
review"? What will the reviewing agent be watching for ? And why
are these documents so Important ? The answers to these questions
will be sought.
The Business Record
One of the very first things a surety agent is going to ask for when
trying to determine ones "bondablllty" Is ones business record. The
business record gives the agent a large amount of key Information.
This Information Includes the following:
A) The name of the company will be given and information
Indicating whether It Is a proprietorship, partnership or corporation.
It is also by name, that a company's reputation and how well it is
known, can be checked.
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B) This record, gives the class of the contractor (this Is nol a social
class evaluation, but considers the kinds of Jobs they have
undertaken). It Is at this point that the agent takes Into
consideration previous work undertaken, the necessary experience
required for a successful operation, and the adequacy of the capital
Investment.CThe agent also examines the adequacy of the company's
pre-Job evaluation skills, assesses the operation size, efficiency,
management capabilities, how they had done In bidding and the state
of their finances). Success depends on that delicate balance between
experience and management and these attributes must be
ascertained). It Is at this stage of the process, that company age Is
put under extreme scrutiny. While most surety companies avoid
dealing with companies with less than 3 to 5 years of experience,
those with even 6 to 10 years have exhibited problems In being able to
"stay afloat". Thus, the evaluating agent will examine the records
carefully checking all those areas known to have brought about
trouble for less established companies.
C) Location Is considered carefully. They look at where the off Ice
and or yard are, and how they are operated. Is It operated efficiently ?
Is It under staffed/over staffed ? Are the expenses used to run the
operation, appropriate for the operation ? Are things done a bit more
extravagantly than would be absolutely necessary ?
D) Continuity In same line, (versus diversification) Is preferred.
The agent makes certain that all periods of time since the companies
Inception are accounted for. A time gap could Indicate a point of
business failure. This is Information that the surety would rightfully
need to know.One piece of Information that would be vital for the
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surety to know, would be if any other bonding company had ever been
forced to pay on a bond placed on this firm before. Bonding is
supposed to be a no loss business and the bonding agent's job is to
make sure that it remains that way. Bonding a company that has failed
to fulfill its contracted obligations elsewhere would be taking a very
great risk.
When considering a company's management experience, the bonding
agent will be looking at a variety of factors. If the company is run
via partnership, the agent will look at the character and experience of
all partners. Do they complement one another ? Do they bring to the
partnership individual strengths that give unity to the company ?
This individual consideration of management composition is not
simply confined to partnerships but also applies to corporations.
Another consideration, made in looking at management, is the
stability of the company's "management hierarchy". Rarely, for a
successful contracting firm
,
should there be changes in the "upper"
management realms. If such a change does occur there is usually a
strong reason. This hierarchical change may indicate that all is not
well within the company and may warn that stability might very soon
become a perilous issue.
The Personal Record
Aside from the business record, an evaluating bonding agent is going
to require the personal records of those making up the principals of
the contracting firm. The personal record considers :
a) the employee's prior success as an employee
b) what kind of job record they have brought with them
c) the employees experience within the field
d) have they ever been released from a job and for what reason(s).
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Having lost a job due to independability or chemical abuse, may give
the evaluating agent a negative picture. It Is Important that the
positives and negatives are known so that the agent Is able to make
an Informed evaluation. The company bonded Is to be backed by the
surety's reputation. They must make sure that the company they
guarantee, Is represented by dependable and honorable business
personnel. Another Item considered In the personal record, Is whether
these principals have confined their business activity to a single area
of "the business". Diversity may provide a great deal of knowledge
but concentrated knowledge and experience In the one area In which
they are trying to be bonded Is going to weigh more In their favor.
Experience gives them an edge in the "success equation" that was
discussed earlier. If one has outside Income, or "connections", it
should not be mentioned or listed unless the money is to be made
readily available. As previously mentioned, the personal record
needs, to Include any previous failures that may have been
experienced by the contractor. Some contractors learn by their
mistakes, but the true test Is in the frequency or pattern of such
mistakes. While not easy to discuss, it too must come to the
reviewing agent's attention.
Age Is also considered in the personal record. Advanced age In
management may indicate a conservative management. It may also
Indicate an Inability to recover losses or meet the demands that
might occur with any sizable overexpansion program. The
conservative nature of older management does not allow for risk
taking. On the other hand, management run by young men may lack the
maturity, experience or judgement that would be needed to see them
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through critical situations. The young tend to be more ambitious and
aggressive and they are more likely to Incorporate new construction
methods Into their operations. The best mix would be to team the two
groups. Such a combination gives maturity and control with the desire
to grow and the willingness to try the new. The evaluating agent will
probably be most concerned with the tendency of the young to
overextend. This may place the younger managers at a greater
disadvantage In the evaluation procedure. Family businesses,
especially those being run by the second and third generat1ons,are
more likely to suffer from financial trouble and poor management. The
Idea that one has been handed position and success, has not
traditionally produced successful managerial material. Under this
supposition, family businesses, especially those run by second and
third generations, are likely to undergo greater scrutiny.
The Trade Payment Record
A third record of consideration is termed the trade payment record.
This is a necessary consideration for the bonding evaluation. While
the business and personal records give an overview of the
contractors' abilities to manage their businesses and their lives, it is
the payment record that records how they manage their accounts. The
history of a business's current trade payments can either readily
confirm the favorable factors developed up to that point or they can
point to highly questionable or potentially unfavorable conditions. The
evidence of an unreasonably slow pay record or a developing trend in
that direction are some of the strongest danger signals the evaluating
agent may observe. The big question for the evaluator becomes, if
contractors have the character factors and financial responsibility
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has placed them in a position of positive consideration, then why are
they running behind In their payments ? The evaluator will have to
come to a satisfactory conclusion before the company can come up for
full bond consideration.
Prior Experience must be looked Into very carefully. Considered will
be the nature of previous projects, the size of those projects, the
number of years of experience acquired, position held during those
projects, the age and education of both the contractor and the
supervisory staff. These factors are considered the essential tools
for an evaluators Judgement of a contractors capacity. The
experience a contractor has gained In the service of other contractors
and the length of that service can have an effect on the stature of
each and every member of the contractor's management team. Past
experience can be a favorable factor when gained in the service of a
firm known for Its organizational strength and success. This is the
kind of company a person bent on success is going to seek out. By the
same token experiences In companies that may have been weak, and
whose business practices were questionable, may saddle contractors
with lessons they are unable or unwilling to lay aside. The evaluator
will have to discern whether the applying contractors were involved
In the practices that brought those previous companies Into
unfavorable circumstances.
Inadequate experience In the final decision making process Is the
greatest source of failure among "new" contractors. The question
becomes, how can the manager who lacks experience, direct the
superintendent, the estimator or other support employees who may
also be Inexperienced ? It is because of the lack of experience and the
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potential havoc It can cause, that the prior experience record Is
examined with such care. Successful contract bonding deals with an
underwriters ability to determine whether a contractor has the
necessary skills and organization to perform the job.
There are four questions an evaluating agent asks when considering
the Qualities of a contractors organization, they are:
1) Is the organization overstaffed ?
2) Is the organization understaffed ?
3) Is the organization well-balanced ?
4) Is the organization one of succeeding generations ?
Question number one, tries to determine whether there may be too
many employees for the jobs at hand. This occurs quite often In new
ventures because of overriding enthusiasm or optimism. They have had
no offsetting direct experience to guide them. It also occurs in
family businesses that have passed their prime but have not modified
their staffs to accommodate the changes that followed.
In question number two, the evaluating agents have found that an
Insufficient number of key staff personnel to supervise the work
properly may prove self-defeating. This often occurs when a small
contractor begins to grow and either refuses, or is unable to
successfully delegate responsibility, and ends up trying to make all
decisions personally.
In question number three, the agent is able to see whether there is
an adequate dispersal of responsibility and power. A well-balanced
organization recognizes Its strengths and Its weaknesses and
operates successfully within those bounds. Considered here are
turn-over and experience among key staff. Keeping those "in the know"
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In control while allowing the new to learn, opens the way for a
healthy successful business operation. One thing must be maintained
at all times, however, the manager must be aware of each and every
detail of the job. Overall supervision Is the one thing a successful
contractor cannot delegate.
Number four was previously discussed In the section on personal
records. To reiterate, records show that on a percentage basis the
mortality rate of a business established by father and run by son Is
exceptionally high. It seems that the more successful the fathers
are, the less prepared the sons are to take over. This makes family
succession businesses a greater risk consideration.
Choosing Competent Associates
One thing a bonding agent looks at when doing a "prequallflcatlon
review", Is what kinds of specialized staff the contractor has chosen.
By evaluating those the contractor has chosen, the agent will have one
more character trait on which to evaluate. There Is no substitute for
the ability to choose competent associates. It Is the extent of this
specialized assistance that can make the organization effective or
Ineffective.
Since "one is judged by the associates he keeps", It would be best to
examine the kinds of associates the contractor Is expected to have
acquired. What kinds of traits are they expected to possess to create
a favorable Impression on the reviewing agent ?
One of the first parties In a construction firm to come under close
scrutiny Is the estimator. An estimator's estimating accuracy and
bidding ability are shown In the final costs of completed projects.
While bids are usually reviewed and checked by the other personnel In
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the contractor's firm, usually the principals, before a bid Is
presented, an estimator dominates the bidding program. Additional
care Is required when estimating jobs In which the contractor Is not
fully experienced. Estimators are clearly In a position to Influence
bidding In a damaging fashion. Estimators can be forceful,
opportunistic and very convincing. Their worst fault Is to encourage
contractors to overexpand and to take on work beyond their
experience or capacity. Since estimators have the capability of
directing or focusing the future of contractors, their background, and
bidding authority should receive careful examination. If the surety
examiners do not like what they find, it is not uncommon for them to
decline an account.
The company's superintendent should also undergo careful
examination. There have been incidences wherein superintendent
have passed themselves off as being specialists in a field unfamiliar
to the contractor. In this position of authority the superintendent
can Induce the contractor to bid work that should not be bid. The
bonding agent checks for such weaknesses and If there appear to be
any questionable areas, or If the profitability of operations are
lacking, the contractor will be advised to run a profitability check on
each superintendent.
The selection of an accountant Is not always easy. Only 10% of
those accountants which are licensed are considered to be fully
qualified in the knowledge and application of auditing in the
construction business (15). It must be understood that without a
qualified outside accountant, particularly a certified public
accountant, the proper cost information is either open to question or
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unavailable. This diminishes the accuracy of financial reporting to
the surety (8).
The areas of construction and bonding require a basic understanding
of contract law and detailed knowledge of construction law. Being
associated with an attorney who Is well-versed In construction
matters Is extremely beneficial. This is an association that is seen
to be In the contractor's best Interest. The attorney's assistance may
be enlisted in matters ranging from contract confirmation and
interpretation to management representation The underwriter will
evaluate the attorney by reputation and by known experience In the
field.
After a bond has been issued to a contractor, the surety, must
carefully monitor the activities of that contractor. The bonding agent
must remain alert, checking for the presence of any warning signs
that might Indicate contractor difficulty. If these warning signs are
missed, loss may not be averted. These "warning signs" must be
acknowledged and explained. The knowledge that they exist and that
they need to be addressed promptly are prerequisites to terminating
the problem at Its source. Identifying the warning signs early is
essential. It must also be recognized that different types of warning
signs may exist. A general listing of these "Warning Signs" are listed
below: (16)
WARNIN6 SI6NS
1) A history of frequent loss jobs
2) Inadequate construction volume
3) Excessive volume
4) Unusually high overhead expenses
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5) Slow or poor quality receivables
6) Over-Investment In fixed assets
7) Participation In certain types of joint ventures
8) Investments In outside ventures
9) Entry Into new lines of construction with Inadequate preparation
10) Entry Into new geographical areas with Inadequate knowledge
ID Other Considerations
History of Frequent Loss Jobs
A history of frequent losses on jobs suggests that some difficulty
has arisen In trying to operate profitably. While a frequency pattern
would Indicate real problems, almost every contractor has
experienced at least one. Reasons for a loss job can include: (17)
1) Poor bidding
2) Inadequate field supervision
3) Unanticipated labor strikes
4) Cost escalations
5) Sluggish, material deliveries
6) Unanticipated weather conditions
7) Subcontractor performance failures
8) Difficult relationships with owners or architects
9) Poor management of change orders
These are not unavoidable problems however, for there are several
steps a contractor can take to try to avert a loss. These Include: ( 1 8)
1) Including escalation clauses in contracts with owners
2) Requiring that subcontractors be bonded (a move noted earlier as
denoting the presence of good business sense).
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3) Making sure that the contract price Is sufficient to cover
contingencies. (18)
Implementation of these methods may help avoid possible financial
disaster.
Inadequate Construction Volume:
Inadequate construction volume may result In total gross profits
being Insufficient to cover the contractor's general costs,
administrative costs and other fixed costs. Inadequate volume may
also motivate the contractor to submit bids with smaller margins,
thereby Increasing the risk of an unprofitable contract.
Excessive Volume
Excessive volume can strain a company's supervisory resources and
lead to loss of control over field work. Under these conditions, profit
erosion or actual losses may occur. The company's capital may be
Inadequate to finance the levels of work In progress and the
receivables may be Insufficient to support an excessive volume of
work.
Unusally High Overhead Expenses
High overhead expenses concern the surety because they may cause
the contractor to take on a greater volume of work than can be
managed profitably.
Slow or Poor Quality Receivables:
A contractor's largest assets generally are the accounts receivable.
Any Indication that receivables are collected slowly or that
collection Is unlikely, Is a real concern. Ways to avoid this situation
might be to choose clientele with great care and make certain the
contractor knows the exact source and the amount of such financing.
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One should check financial Information before a project Is bid.
Additionally, the contractor should use great care In agreeing to Hen
waivers. Ultimately, Hens may be the only mechanism available to the
contractor for collecting receivables.
Over-Investment In Fixed Assets
The contractor assessed as having too great an Investment In
equipment or other fixed assets, holds the potential of long-term
risk. Contractors may have to face reduced working capital, possible
capital loss at the disposal of these assets and the expenses that are
Incurred by servicing required debts.
Participation In Certain Types of Joint Ventures:
Participation In joint ventures may provide certain advantages to the
contractor. In a joint venture there Is someone else to share the
risks, give added experience In estimating, and can remove the
possibility of a potential competitor on specific projects.
Partnerships may hold risks too, especially If the partner Is not
financially strong enough to make the necessary cash or equipment
contributions to the union. Misunderstandings can arise If each
Individuals rights and responsibilities to the partnership are not
clearly spelled out and mutually agreed upon. Without a plan and an
agreed upon director or sponsor, projects may lack both control and
direction. This may In turn lead to possible financial loss.
Investments In Outside Ventures:
In dealing with outside ventures, a significant portion of the
company's capital or the contractors time, are committed to outside
and unrelated activities. The company's available working capital Is
thereby reduced. Reducing cash and credit availability then strains
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the contractor's ability to effectively manage the company.
New Lines of Construction with Inadequate Preparation
Joint ventures often mark the movement of a contractor from one
area of expertise to a new, and possibly, more lucrative construction
field. While the lure of more money Is great, as a rule, the chances of
the contractor finding It are extremely low. What tends to be
overlooked In the desire to expand Is the absence of new field
expertise In the new field. They fall to consider the fact that new
fields quite often require new equipment. Staff, experienced in their
original line of construction, may be just as inexperienced in the new
field. One example of this would be the experience of a "large and
successful underground contractor who, because of a slowdown in
local work, entered the high-way construction field and found that, to
be competitive, he had to meet three overpowering factors:
1) a substantial capital Investment in equipment
2) the need for qualified personnel
3) and an excessive demand on his time and attention
Two years later, he quickly withdrew from that field because of
substantial losses. The competitive factors, the unseasoned
personnel, the heavy burden of equipment costs he foresaw, if
continued, would have only one result— bankruptcy" (19). This
contractor was fortunate. It is seldom that the danger signs are
recognized in time to prevent permanent loss. Another consideration
Is that requirements for field specialties are not dependable. They
fluctuate because of changes that occur In construction methods or in
the manner jobs are awarded. The owner's policy for awarding jobs
may follow certain guidelines for an extended period of time and then
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may be abruptly changed, redefined and sometimes phased out. Such
policies may Include, jobs set aside for small business or combining
jobs which would adversely affect the smaller contractor. This may
make it financially Impossible for the contractor to participate under
the new rules. Because of the precarious situations a change of field
can bring about, an underwriter will use great care In examining all
aspects the change may effect. Contractors wishing to expand Into
new fields are urged to start slowly, giving themselves a chance to
gain expertise. Quite often they may find that joining with a
specialist In the new field can prove beneficial and more financially
satisfying.
New Geographical Area:
Another problem area, is that of entering new geographical areas
with inadequate knowledge . The entry of a contractor into new
geographical areas, whether domestic or foreign, without adequate
preparation can result in critical job losses. Damages may be
Incurred by being unfamiliar with local labor personnel and
practices, by not knowing about the site or material availability, not
having experience with the indigenous soil conditions, etc. Such new
contractors may also encounter resistance within the community to
their presence or they may overlook the problems associated with
moving job operations away from the home base. In geographical
relocation, the need for new equipment and trained supervisory
personnel must be acknowledged and Implemented. If this is not
carefully considered, the contractor may be forced to make




The underwriter will also examine a company's payment practices.
This Is done through outside sources such as credit agencies and
credit reports. A prompt payment pattern Is a big plus for the
company under review. It establishes the contractor's responsibility
and managerial capabilities.
Another warning sign Is that of taking on and trying to handle too
many jobs . Quite often, a contractor can "get In over his head" and
get Involved In so many projects that none receive the careful
attention they require. When the taking on of a new job Is considered,
questions of who Is to run the job and whether there Is sufficient
qualified staff to handle the project effectively must be carefully
considered. Underwriters are very watchful when contractors start
"racking up" jobs. They may even deny a bond request if they feel a
contractor Is "spreading himself too thin".
Not all who experience failure fall Into any or all of these traps. It
can not be stressed enough, however, that extreme forethought and





The purpose of this paper Is to Identify the means/methods used by
the surety Industry to determine the financial stability of
construction firms. The paper took a look at how sureties differ In
their approaches when dealing with a "seasoned" contractor, as
opposed to the "young" contractor (one In business less than 3 to 5
years). The hypothesis was, that young contractors have not been In
business long enough to develop a solid track record by which to be
judged, and would thereby be examined more closely In the areas of
financial status and managerial expertise.
After some preliminary research in the library, it became apparent
that this Information was not readily available on the bookshelves.
Most of the information that was found, dealt primarily with "what
bonding Is", and the functions of the parties involved in the bond (the
contractor,the owner (as obligee), and the surety). They also dealt
with how a contractor's stability is measured through the eyes of the
surety, without differentiating between the established and young
contractors. This was further substantiated when listening to a
surety broker who emphasized that the surety industry is by no means
an exact science, for it Is to some degree, subject to the personal
preferences and idiosyncrasies of each individual underwriter.
With the above Information It became apparent that the required
data would best be collected directly from the field. Thus, the
primary means of data collection was through surveys in the form of
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questionnaires. Prior to forwarding the questionnaire, a draft was
examined by a surety broker to ensure completeness and accuracy.
Refinements were made and incorporated. The questionnaire contained
18 questions requesting information from bonding companies on the
means/methods used by them in determining the financial stability of
a construction firm. The questions were either short answer or
multiple choice in nature. Five of the 18 questions asked the
underwriters to prioritize the choices given, including any that they
may have added, in order to determine if any similarities existed in
those particular areas. The nature of the questions allowed the
following areas to be examined:
a) Considerations when issuing a bond
b) Bonding limits and bid results
c) Keeping in touch during construction
d) Warning signs
e) Reasons for failures
A copy of the questionnaire may be found in Appendix D.
In order to enhance the number of replies, the surety broker provided
the researcher with a letter of introduction, briefly stating the
purpose of the questionnaire and soliciting their participation. It was
believed that the sureties would be more inclined to participate in
the survey if a sense of rapport could be developed.
A total of twenty-five questionnaires were sent out to each of the
companies listed on "The Surety Underwriters Association of
Seattle— 1985 membership roster. Of these twenty-five companies,
four corporations chose not to participate in the study. One agent
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said "no", stating that he personally was uninterested In
participating. One company declined because they did not feel they
could benefit In any way by participating, and the third and fourth
declined on the basis of the fact that their firms were "specialty
Surety Operations," dealing almost completely In cases with bonds
which were unacceptable to the conventional commercial market.
Therefore, when cases were placed with them, their approach to
putting cases together so that they were writable, were entirely
different than surety theory In the industry recommended". This
reduced the total of possible returns to 21. The initial return count
was 9, representing a 41 % response rate. Approximately 3 weeks
after the surveys were initially sent out, calls were placed to those
corporations who had not yet responded. These calls were made to
ascertain if the surveys had indeed been received. Additionally, the
purpose of the research study could be more fully explained with
obtaining a sense of each surety's willingness to participate in the
study. Some valuable information was exchanged through these calls.
Two sureties indicated that they had not received the questionnaire
and that they would be interested In participating in the survey if one
could be provided. The questionnaire was sent to both these sureties
and their responses were received. In addition, four underwriters
stated that they had not yet finished filling out the survey but would
try to finish within the next couple of days. The week following the
calls saw an additional 6 responses. This brought the total number of
responses to 15 which represents a 71% response rate. It was also at
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this time that two of the corporations previously mentioned,
acknowledged that they would not be participating.
Means used to help induce participation included:
A) The assurance of anonymity to the respondents
B) The use of multiple choice and short answer type questions
to make answering easier.
C) Sureties were provided with self addressed stamped
envelopes
,
making returns more convenient.
The results of these 15 questionnaires were then analyzed to try and
determine some field consistencies in evaluating styles and
requirements. Later, telephone interviews were set up to try and
focus in on those areas that truly presented themselves as being of
greatest importance. These six telephone interviews followed pretty
much the format as did the questionnaire. Since information is not
easily obtained through mailed questionnaires, the phone interviews
were used to expound on the issues which presented themselves
through the questionnaire and to discuss any questions which were
raised due to the responses received. The information was then
analyzed to establish the grounds for their supportive philosophies.
The telephone conversations lasted on an average of about 25 minutes
with a range of 10 minutes to 60 minutes.
One of the questions in the interview dealt with the methods used In
establishing the "bonding capacities" for contractors. It was
Interesting to note that one of the responses inquired, "Do you have
two years to sit and listen", "three if you have any questions".
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Responses like these emphasized that only through personal
Interviews would It be possible to collect Information on all the
necessary Ingredients on which the surety Industry functions. The
six personal Interviews provided additional Information In supporting
the responses already received through the mailed questionnaire. In
addition, new areas were discussed (e.g., the loss ratio, accounting
techniques, stricter underwriting criteria, failures for seasoned
contractors, etc,) in order to round out the entire picture. The
Interviews were semi-Informal lasting between 30 minutes and 3
hours. Though a list of questions were prepared, much of the time
was spent conversing back and forth on whatever topic was under
discussion. This proved most helpful in that it provided a more
congenial atmosphere and allowed for the information to flow with
more continuity.
The last question on the questionnaire asked whether the
underwriters would mind being contacted by phone for further
discussion of these matters. In every Instance their replies
welcomed the opportunity, others even suggested meeting in person.
Needless to say, both avenues were undertaken and proved most




mjFsm rs of QUE3LLU1MMAIM.
With a basic understanding of the prequalification process and its
importance, one may look at the various constituents sureties rely on
to help them determine whether a contractor possesses the proper
ingredients to be classified as a "qualified risk". The information
gathered here was compiled from the questionnaires which were
returned by participating surety companies. The five major headings
which will be examined include:
a) Considerations when issuing a bond
b) Bonding limits and bid results
c) Keeping in touch during construction
d) Warning signs
e) Failures
Each will be discussed separately and presented in the above order.
(See Appendix D for a sample of the questionnaire).
I D
This section drew its findings from the responses given for
questions 1,2,3,6,8,9,12,17, &18 of the questionnaire.
There are several areas which the sureties maintain must be
carefully evaluated prior to the issuance of any bond. Those of major
importance are "loosely" prioritized below:
a) Financial statements of contractor




d) Contractor's expertise on this type of project
e) Dollar value of the project
f ) Geographic location of project
g) Owner availability of funds
h) Contract specifications
The financial statements which the contractor is usually required to
present to the surety are: a) the consolidated balance sheet, b) the
consolidated income statement, c) the statement of changes in
financial position, d) the statement of earnings and retained earnings,
e) the schedule showing the contracts in progress, f) the schedule
showing the contracts completed for year ending, and g) the schedule
showing the selling, general and administrative expenses for year
ending. With these statements in hand, the underwriter is able to
examine the financial strength of the contractor. By reviewing the
contractor's balance sheet and income statements, the line totals
enable them to get a fair picture of the companies "health". Through
the careful manipulation of these line totals, "key business ratios"
may be ascertained.
The questionnaire contained questions on this topic of ratios. The
survey asked each surety representative to prioritize the importance
of various financial ratios. There are 14 such ratios that are
commonly-used in the business world (6). The respondents to the
survey stated that of these 14 ratios 8, to varying degrees, are
viewed by the underwriters as being of vital financial significance.
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These important ratios are as follows:
a) Working capital/work on hand
b) Current ratio
c) Net profits on net working capital
d) Net profit on sales
e) Net sales to net working capital
f ) Current debt to tangible net worth
g) Gross profit to sales
h) Total debt to net worth
In addition to these ratios, perhaps the most significant financial
indicator is the working capital. (The meanings of these ratios and
other associated terms have been defined and may be found in the
glossary ). The relative importance of these financial ratios is
illustrated in Figure 9. The surety representatives were asked to
rank the above ratios under the following four main headings:
1) very important
2) important
3) nice to know
4) not important/not used.
In viewing the graph, it is evident that the two most widely used
"ratios" are the working capital/ work on hand and the current ratio.
The "working capital," though not a ratio, in and of itself relates
information about responsibility and compatibility. All the sureties
use it in varying degrees to help them arrive at the "bonding capacity"
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Working capital also represents the margin of protection to meet
current obligations and future commitments. Its sufficiency should
be such that it will finance the undertakings of a contractor and meet
those risks that are inherent to the business without financial
adversity. In essence, it should enable the contractor: (20)
(a) to pay promptly the current obligations and to take advantage
of cash discounts
(b) to provide for needed capital outlays
(c) to permit the continuance of the business during any period
of inactivity or depression
(d) to meet such losses that may arise during contracts
(e) to provide for emergencies, such as strikes and other labor
problems or because of floods and fire, or the like
(f ) to absorb losses that may occur because of the owner's or
subcontractor's failure
Other ratios which were considered to be of importance were those
containing the term net worth. This is another indicator which the
sureties have attempted to use as a guideline in helping set bonding
limits.
With an understanding of which ratios the sureties consider to be of
value, the next step would be to "get a handle on" the value of each
ratio so that a proper perspective may be obtained. The two most
commonly-used publications for this purpose are the Dun and
Bradstreet Journal entitled
"
Key Business Ratios ", and the "r m a"
(Robert Morris Associates) publication entitled "Annual Statement
Studies ". Each of these publications identify the line of business by
its SIC (standard industrial classification number). Those pertaining
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to the general building contractors have SIC numbers of 1541 and 1542.
Since it would not be realistic to give a single value for each ratio,
due to the diversity within the construction industry, or for any other
industry for that matter, both publications have three listings
associated with each ratio. These are, the upper auartile, the
median, and the lower auartile . The upper quartile consists of that
number above which 25% of the ratios have a higher value, while the
lower quartile consists of that number below which 25% of the ratios
have a lower value. The median range consists of 50% of those ratio
values that fall between the upper and lower quartile values. To gain
a deeper understanding of ratio analysis, those ratios used by the
sureties have been cross-referenced with those ratios outlined in the
Dun and Bradstreet Journal. (See Tables 4-12 in Appendix A). While
all sureties indicated which ratios were used during the
prequalification period, only a few indicated their
maximum/minimum value. The values they set were dependent on the
ratios, they wanted to see coming from the contractor's financial
statements. One ratio which received several responses was the
current ratio. The sureties varied in their preferences as values
ranged from 1.2 to 2.0, with a majority "hovering" in and around 1.5.
Those who responded at the "low end" made it very clear that the
"liquidity" of the company was the main issue at hand. (Ratio analysis
will be discussed in more detail in the personal interview section of
this report).
The sureties were asked to prioritize the information which they
felt was of most value in assessing the contractor's stability. Their
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all the "information" carried equal weight, i.e., none were any more
critical than others but all were required to develop a firm foundation
on which to judge the contractor. The remaining thirteen respondents
ranked the choices with some indicating equal weight among the
choices by assigning them identical values. As mentioned earlier,
different sureties tend to judge contractors differently. This arises
from the fact that the surety industry is not an exact science, thereby
allowing individual preferences to emerge. This is clearly indicated
when examining the range of values given by the sureties for the
different choices. For example, for the rankings associated with the
"track record of work successfully completed", two sureties listed it
as being "most important" while yet another surety indicated it was
the "least important" among the various choices. By averaging all
responses, giving equal weight to each numeric response, an attempt
was made to prioritize the information that the sureties considered
in evaluating contractors. The category entitled "other", was not
included in the ranking as it is comprised of a number of the varying
responses. The following results were obtained and are shown in
descending order of importance: (Average ranking value given in
parentheses)
1) Present financial condition of the company (1.769)
2) Furnished information on "current projects underway" (3.154)
3) Track record of work successfully completed (3.231
)
4) Resumes of contractor and key personnel (5.250)
5) Management perpetuation (5.385)
6) Rationale about project being bid on (5.500)
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7) References from previous contractor clients (5.545)
8) Bank line of credit (5.583)
The priority ranking of the first three items is clear. The remaining
5 categories however, were very closely ranked among each other and
thus their relative positions are not distinctly defined.
When contractors approach sureties, there are various documents
which will be required of them. The underwriter will carefully
examine these during the prequalification period. Table 3 was
constructed showing the weight given by the sureties to the various
documents they require. Certain documents were found to span the
entire spectrum. They ranged from having high ranks to having low
ranks. This again substantiates the statement that the surety
industry is by no means a precise or consistent business. As before,
an attempt was made to prioritize this documentation by averaging
all the responses. The results are shown below in descending order of
priority:
1) CPA prepared annual financial statements (1.067)
2) Status on any and all outstanding jobs (2.733)
3) Line of bank credit (3.670)
4) Cost records (4.222)
5) Credit references (4.727)
6) Credit bureau reports (4.769)
7) Annual "physicals" from key personnel (8.000)
The "financial aspects" and the "status on current projects
underway" head the rankings as being items of greatest influence.
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Another item which needs to be noted is the "other" category. There
are nine items comprising this category. These are listed in the order
in which they appear in Table 3 . For example, respondent no. 3
ranked "continuity plans" as being the 6th most important while
respondent no. 10 ranked "history & future expectations of the firm"
as being the 2nd most important piece of information required. Again,
this category was not ranked among the individual items due to its
make-up.
The Young Contractor
The sureties were asked to identify what they felt were the "main
considerations" used when evaluating the "young contractor". (The
"young contractor" being one who has been in business for less than
three years). The same responses to this open-ended question were
repeatedly mentioned and are listed below:
a) Prior experience; construction and personal (1 1 responses)
b) Financial strength & growth potential (1 1 responses)
c) Management expertise/business acumen ( 6 responses)
d) Expectations of the firm ( 5 responses)
e) Character & cooperation of the contractor ( 6 responses)
f ) Track record and current work program ( 5 responses)
Other factors which were indicated, but to a lesser degree, were:
a) profit history of firm, b) references from past jobs, and c) the
company's CPA firm. One surety simply replied, "We don't bond young
contractors". Another stated that it was "essentially the same as for
any other contractor. If they have been in business approximately
three years and meet our underwriting criteria, we would not reject
them solely because of their relative short time in business". Most
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sureties seemed to follow the suit of the latter respondent, but
added the stipulation that more emphasis is placed on both
management ability and financial strength to make up for the track
record which has not had the time to fully mature. One surety stated
that
,
"the same priorities are used, but we look harder at
management ability because most of the other items have not had a
chance to develop fully. The contractor assumes a greater risk when
he/she becomes the owner and the final decision maker for all
aspects of the organization".
When sureties were asked whether there were any major differences
between evaluating established contractors with whom they had no
familiarity and with the young contractor, the general consensus was
pretty evenly divided. Many stated that the only notable difference
was in the established track record and the industry references.
Others viewed it as " a known quantity vs an unknown quantity" even
though they had no formal knowledge of either. The established
contractors were easier to evaluate as there was more history, credit
references, completion history and proven track records for them .
One surety pointed out that, "the longer the track record of success,
assuming no significant changes in organization, the greater the
comfort level of the bond underwriter". Another responded, "surety
underwriting is not an exact science. Yes, there are guidelines that
we follow, but the key to emerging success is good internal controls,
adequate capitalization and an "experienced" staff. Bonding any. "new
contractor" is a crap game to a certain degree and there are markets




One important character trait that sureties insist upon, is the
contractors willingness to stand behind their companies through the
good times and the bad. The sureties attempt to determine this level
of commitment by having the contractors personally indemnify
themselves. In essence, the owner(s) of the company and their
spouses sign a general contract of indemnity which specifies that the
principals of the bonds will reimburse the surety, using whatever
means possible including personal assets, should the surety suffer
losses on their account. (A sample contract may be found in
Appendix B). This procedure is required of virtually all contractors.
The sureties have indicated that 100% of the young contractors must
indemnify without exception. Approximately 90% of the sureties
stated that indemnification, without exception, was also required for
established contractors. A small remainder showed the percent to be
between 95-100% for the established contractor. This was dependent
on whether the company had unquestioned experience and the financial
ability to reach its objectives. In all cases but one, neither the
dollar size of the job nor the work program had any bearing on
determining the need to indemnify. It simply rested on the
contractors' willingness to stand behind the company.
1 1 Bonding Limits and Bid Results : (Information presented in
this section was extracted from questions 7, 10, 11, 14, & 18 of the
questionnaire).
When issuing bonds, sureties establish amounts for each contractor
beyond which no additional bonds will be issued. These are referred
to as "bonding limits". In arriving at "bonding limits" for their client
contractors, most sureties replied by saying that virtually each case
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requires separate evaluation and involves "subjective" judgement.
Those evaluation characteristics noted as being of highest priority
were the combination of experience, geographic location, financial
strength, current workload, and character rating. Regarding the
financial perspective, the following
"
guidelines" were suggested for
defining bonding capacity by the different respondents with the
understanding that these, in themselves, are not sufficient:
a) "We like to have working capital at least equal to 10% of all
work outstanding" (5 respondents)
b) "In theory, a 10% case is "ideal" but in reality we can't define
this. The percentage has dropped over the years, and changes
depending on type of contractor: road pavers: 8-10%, subs:
8-10%, G.C. builders 5-8% (as low as 3%), much depends
on nature of work" (1 respondent)
c) "Our limits are set by, first, finding out what the contractor
feels comfortable doing. Then accept or adjust it based on
working capital and net worth" (1 respondent)
d) "Extremely difficult to quantify; but very generally speaking,
at least a 15 to 20 : 1 ratio of total uncompleted work on
hand compared to working capital (2 respondents)
e) "As a rule of thumb, a contractor's "line" is the lesser of:
10 x (working capital) or (1 respondent)
4 x (net worth)
f) Generally Speaking: (1 respondent)
Typical Job Size Bonding Limit
< $100,000 10 x working capital
$100,000 - 2,500,000 20 x working capital
$2,500,000 & up 30 x working capital
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g) "From a slightly different perspective, the amount of a single
bonded job should not exceed 50% of the "bonding limit".
(2 respondents)
This same result was obtained in a previous study conducted by
Jimmie Hinze and W.B. Ashton (21).
The sureties were asked to give an approximation, in percent, of
how many of their client contractors had been denied at least one
bond request in the last 5 years. Unfortunately, a number of sureties
responded that they do not keep statistics on this and, therefore had
no realistic means on which to base a response. Those that did,
responded as follows:







There were no consistent reasons cited for denying bond requests.
Rather than attempting to analyze the data, the responses are given
verbatim below.
The reasons given for rejection of bond requests included:
a) "Lack of experience on job site and/complexity"
b) "Geographic location of project"
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c) "Adverse trends in financial strength"
d) "Too many jobs": overextension
e) "One extremely large job relative to contractor's past
experience, this type of situation would generally cause the
contractor to put all risks in one job. Prefer to see risk spread
over several jobs". (Lack of diversification)
f ) "Contractor wants to grow faster than we feel that he should".
g) "Total work on hand and the working capital situation",
h) "Work is of a different nature".
i) "Unusual contract terms",
j) "Managerial problems".
One surety indicated that, "More bonds are declined through
ignorance than almost anything else. A second reason, would be trying
to take on too big a workload. Anything that can be done to lessen
these two reasons will go a long way in reducing the number of
declinations and the emotions associated with them".
All sureties confirmed that when they do refuse to issue a bond,
the contractor's bank is not notified as there was no reason for doing
so.
Accuracy of a Bid
In order for contractors to function profitably they must ensure that
all cost associated with a particular job have been included in the bid
price. Should contractors enter into jobs in which this is not the
case, any additional costs will have to come out of their "profit
margin". Since profit margins, as of late, have been quite small this
impact could be catastrophic. Sureties are well aware of this and try
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to prevent this occurrence by attempting to determine the "accuracy
of the bid". The sureties all agree that the only real practical means
of determining the accuracy of a bid is to compare it with the bids of
other contractors who actively sought the job. After the contractor
is deemed to be the low bidder, the payment and performance bonds
must be requested by the contractor. When this is done, the
contractor is generally asked to provide the underwriter with a list
of the competing bidders and their associated bid amounts. The
differences between bids will reflect the diversities of opinion
among the contractors as to the cost of the job. Sureties would like
to see at least the three lowest bids being fairly close together as
this helps assure them that the low bid is reasonably accurate. One
surety stipulated that another advantage to this was that, if the
contractor was to fail, there is a chance that one of the other
low-bidding companies might be able to complete the job at their bid
amount. A marked variance among the respective bids could be a
warning that the low bidder does not have an accurate price or did not
fully comprehend the extent of the work. All sureties stated that as a
"general rule" whenever there is a difference of 10% or more between
the low bidder and the 2nd low bidder, the surety will require the
contractor to explain the difference. Other factors which enter into
the 10% rule are:
1) the size of the job relative to the contractor's experience
2) the financial strength of the contractor
3) number of bids involved (the more bids there are, the more
significant the bid spread)
4) the type of job (larger spreads are common in heavy construction
than in general building construction).
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One surety stated that, "the surety must always bond, with rare
exception, the lowest bidder because it is the lowest bidder who is
awarded the job. The surety has no other choice; it either bonds the
low bidder or it must get out of the business" . Based on the concept
of always awarding contracts to the "lowest bidder," it is
understandable that the mortality rate of contractors ranks high when
compared to other industries. This, in turn, has serious effects on the
"loss ratios" of surety companies. (Loss ratio to be discussed later)
1 1 1 KEEPING IN TOUCH DURING CONSTRUCTION : (This section
draws its information from questions 4, 5 & 16 of the questionnaire).
As pointed out earlier, sureties are financially responsible for up
to the face value of the bond, namely the contract price, in the event
of a contractor default. During the course of construction contracts,
change orders are usually inevitable and almost always increase the
contract price. The sureties are interested in how these change
orders will effect the contractor and what additional impact it may
have on them. To keep abreast of changes, the surety relies on the
following procedures: (Number of responses given in parentheses)
a) Requiring regular reports on change order Information
on all work in process (4 responses)
b) Contractor to notify surety when the change order
amount becomes greater than:
10% of the original contract price (6 responses)
25% of the original contract price (3 responses)
c) Surety is notified by the owner of all changes (3 responses)
d) Change orders will be detected on quarterly "work on
hand spread sheets" as required by some sureties (3 responses)
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Several sureties also noted that whenever a single change order
increases the contract price by 15-25 % they become very interested.
They would want to know if this was due to additional work or if it
was a major design error ? On the other hand, if numerous change
orders are being written the surety looks to see if the job is "snake
bitten"-(a real lemon). It should also be noted that the bond premium
must be adjusted to reflect the final contract price.
The most common means by which sureties monitor progress for
jobs underway is through:
1
)
periodic job reports ( 1 4 responses)
2) schedule status reports ( 1 4 responses)
3) job site visits (9 responses)
4) pay schedule status reports ( 1 4 responses)
5) percent of completion reports ( 1 4 responses)
6) telephone contacts (5 responses)
7) direct discussions with contractors (4 responses)
8) status inquiry with owners/architects (4 responses)
By carefully monitoring job performance, the surety is in a better
position to detect any problems which may arise during the course of
work. The sooner problems are recognized, the more time will be
available to alleviate them. The cost of doing so will be substantially
less than had the problem(s) gone unnoticed. Obviously, all sides
benefit from early detection of problems.
The financial stability of the contractor has proven to be of great
importance no matter what aspect of bonding is being investigated.
Once the contractor has been bonded the surety must continue to
monitor the company's financial position. The sureties pointed out
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that the frequency with which this is performed is dependent on the
size of jobs and the degree of activity of the contractor. Most
sureties require both semi-annual and annual reports. Others also
require quarterly reports but noted they were not of the same detail.
Responses cited were as follows:
Quarterly : internally prepared data on some jobs ( 9 responses)
Semi: internally prepared data on most jobs (12 responses)
Annually : CPA prepared reports - all jobs (10 responses)
Two of the responding sureties indicated they require monthly
reports for financial assessment.(A sample of a summary sheet may
be found in Appendix B).
IV Warning Signs : (responses to question No. 15 of the
questionnaire provided the following information).
As noted previously, early recognition of potential problem areas
can save all parties concerned a great deal in potential losses. To
achieve this early recognition the surety must have some guidelines,
occurrences or "watchwords" that they constantly check and listen
for. Some of the "tools" the sureties listed as being helpful in trying
to determine whether a contractor is experiencing difficulty are as
follows:
WARNING SIGNS OF CONTRACTOR PROBLEMS
a) Liens and/or claim notices (5 responses)
b) Review status reports & work in progress reports
i.e., falling behind schedule, inability to promptly
close out jobs, slow pay, etc (5 responses)
c) Deteriorating financial statements (5 responses)
d) Slowness of information flow (3 responses)
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e) Radical change in pay record (4 responses)
f) Owner complaints: reports from subs and suppliers
of non-payment (2 responses)
g) Poor bank relations (3 responses)
h) Drop in job profits: drop in working capital (9 responses)
i) Street talk of contractor problems (1 responses)
One surety company indicated that the time in which they "get
involved" is not until a demand has been made on the bond. At this
stage it may be too late to help the contractor, and little can be
salvaged. Only by closely monitoring contractors' performances will
it be possible to know their financial situation at a given time. This
early notice is essential if surety assistance is required. Though
monitoring procedures tend to help prevent contractor failure, they
are by no means a panacea, nor are they to be regarded as being a
substitute for efficient management on the part of the contractor.
V Failures , (information for this section was compiled by Dun &
Bradstreet Reports and responses to question 13 of the questionnaire).
According to the Dun and Bradstreet Reports, the number of failures
in construction has taken the following trend:
1970 1687 Contractors Failed $137,245 Avg. Liability/Failure
1975 2262 Contractors Failed 283,309 Avg. Liability/Failure
1980 2355 Contractors Failed 319,367 Avg. Liability/Failure
1981 3614 Contractors Failed 235,689 Avg. Liability/Failure
1982 4872 Contractors Failed 282,085 Avg. Liability/Failure
1983 5247 Contractors Failed 295,131 Avg. Liability/Failure
(This data may also be found on Fig. 5). This Table emphasizes the
tremendous risk being taken by the surety and the need for rigorous
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underwriting criteria. One surety stated that, "the past 4 years have
been extremely difficult for contractor and surety alike. Continued
loss from both sides will force more stringent underwriting
requirements".
Since sureties show the greatest apprehension in bonding younger
contractors, the reasons leading to their failure should be examined.
The questionnaire requested specific information on the causes for
failure. Each of the responses are listed as follows:
1) Poor management: unbalanced staff
2) Lack of sufficient capital
3) Poor information systems
4) Entering into non-construction related activity with
construction company funds.
5) Geographic dispersion
6) Lack of commitment or being too ambitious
7) Spreading himself too thin
8) Inability to make a profit and/or get jobs
9) Poor cost controls
10) Entering into an area in which they are not experienced
11) Growing too fast
12) Taking on jobs larger and more complex than they have the
capacity to handle
One Surety added, "normally a young contractor has had previous
experience with a large major construction company. He has usually
been a project manager who has handled a number of substantial
contracts by himself. When he and a friend start their own company,
they believe they have the capability to do the same type of jobs, but
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they do not have the financial backing. They end up over their heads
or they attempt to grow too quickly and spread themselves too thin".
On 5 June 1985 the newspaper " USA TODAY" printed a section
outlining why businesses fail. It is reproduced below for one's
viewing.
"Most Small Business Failures can be blamed on Bad Management,





Lack of Experience 16%
Owner not Dedicated 16%
Economic Circumstances 13%
Poor Money Management 11%
High Interest Rates 7%
Overspending 5%
Other 18%
* Respondents could cite more than one Category Source:
Comprehensive Accounting Corp. Survey of 203 Firms (22).
The above table is not limited to young firms nor to the construction
field. The statistics includes the many facets of the business field
such as manufacturing, retailing, wholesalers and commercial
services. However, by comparing these reasons with those the
sureties have pointed out, it is apparent that the two coincide for the
most part. This reinforces those areas which must be carefully




This portion of the paper will discuss the Information shared by
surety representatives during "personal interviews". This information
was obtained through six interviews which ranged in length from 30
minutes to 3 hours. Many of the comments made during these
interviews have already been incorporated into the "questionnaire"
section, as the topic areas overlapped considerably.
One of the surprising statistics pointed out by Dun & Bradstreet was
that in the year 1983, the breakdown of " Construction Failures '
gave the following results : (see Figure 8).
Years in Business Percent Failure
Less than 5 32.5
Between 6-10 35.9
More than 10 31.7
It was initially believed that a much higher percentage would belong
to the "Less than 5" year group due to: less experience, not being as
well balanced and lower credit ratings. However, by viewing the
above, a more even failure dispersion exists. The sureties were
asked to comment on this and to give the reasons they felt the
"seasoned contractors" were incurring such a high percentage of the
failures. Some of the reasons given coincided with those previously
given for young contractor failures.

78
All agreed that high interest rates, a sluggish business climate, the
federal deficit and the poor economy have all, in one way or another,
adversely affected private work, federal spending and public
construction. This has resulted in there being more capacity in the
industry than there is work to fill it. This brings about fierce
competition. Those contractors who are unable to adequately cover all
their costs will lower their already low profit margins. More
successful contractors usually do not bid on those jobs that have an
excessive number of bidders. The chances of someone being the low
bidder due to errors in the bid or simply "buying" the job to keep
going, are increased. Some contractors refuse to bid against certain
bidders who consistently bid low, regardless of the number of
bidders. These two reasons are useful measurements of how soundly a
contractor operates.
Reasons Given For Failure (Seasoned Contractors)
As noted previously, the number of "seasoned contractors"
experiencing failure is on the increase. In both questionnaires and
personal interviews, the sureties were asked to give their
explanations of what key factors are bringing these failures about.
The four areas the surety"s saw as being "key", are listed below:
1) Overextension consists of taking on more work than can be
adequately handled. By "spreading themselves too thin", proper
supervision becomes impossible. As a case in point, if a supervisor
be asked to take on one more job than is feasible, not only will the
new job suffer but all other jobs will probably suffer to some degree.
2) New Location- Working in a new geographical location brings
about new areas of concern with which a contractor may not have had
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to deal with previously. This is particularly true if a contractor
pursues work outside of the United States. Such contractors must
deal with problems associated with lower labor rates accompanied by
lower productivity, the lack of qualified technicians, and lack of
available materials. If overseas work is taken, contractors must also
deal with the unfamiliarity of another government's rules and
regulations.
3) New Management - The president of the company may decide to
step down and let the son run the company. Sureties have noted from
past experience that those firms in which the father had a successful
enterprise have a more reduced chance of being prosperous than a
firm in which the father had a mediocre career. This stems from the
fact that those who were quite successful generally tended to run the
show themselves. They did not properly delegate authority so that
"when the time came," the son had been inadequately trained to "fill
the father's shoes". On the other hand, those with mediocre careers
tended to work very closely with their son's, thereby preparing them
to run the business once they stepped down.
Sole owner- The problem that arises in sole ownerships is that no
one has been trained to take the owner's place. The owner knows all
the little "ins and outs" of what makes the company "tick". This type
of knowledge takes time to acquire and implement and must be passed
on from one owner to the next.
4) Disaster/Unforeseen - There are a number of categories which
may fall under this heading. Examples include, fire, flood, employee
fraud and strike. Of these, floods have been most destructive. One
surety told of a contractor who had three jobs. Because of the
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coincident impact of a flood and a strike, he was driven out of
business. Though his equipment was insured, the time lag that
occurred before settlement, coupled with the strike, drove overhead
expenses to a point where he could not recover.
Price Fluctuations can also leave a contractor in trouble. One surety
told of a contractor that had been awarded a job but had not "locked
in" the price quoted by his subs. During this time, the oil prices went
"through the roof" driving up prices on numerous goods. The subs were
no longer able to do the job for the prices they had given earlier. This
had a disastrous effect, for the contract price was already fixed
leaving no way for the contractor to recover his losses.
Ratio Analysis:
The results of questionnaire responses concerning ratio analysis
may be found on Fig. 9. As stated earlier, the two most important
ratios used by the sureties are the working capital to the work on
hand ratio and the current ratio. Noting the ratios the sureties viewed
as being important led to the construction of Tables 4 through 12.
These values were taken from several issues of the Dun & Bradstreet
Reports. This was done to allow for easy comparison between the
values given by the sureties and those of Dun & Bradstreet . The
current ratio lent itself to being fairly easily compared, for most
underwriters had those figures readily available. Having the figures
readily available and being able to give a "value" which would stand
alone were by no means one and the same however. As pointed out
previously, the questionnaire respondents gave values ranging from
1.2 to 2.0 with a median response of approximately 1.50. During a
personal interview, one surety was quick to point out that the
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"current ratio" was completely useless if not accompanied by the
working capital. A person could have current assets of $15.00 and
current liabilities of $10.00 which would give him a current ratio of
1.5. Though this sounds good, it is not until the working capital is
looked at ($15 - $10) that the true picture is revealed. The terms
which make up the ratio are just as important as the ratio itself. In
this example, a working capital of $5.00 is obtained which literally
has no meaning in the construction field. On the other hand, a
company that has a current ratio of 1.5 and a working capital of
$200,000 presents an entirely different picture in the world of
construction. Though both companies have a current ratio of 1.5 their
financial status is entirely different. One surety representative
stated that they would allow a current ratio as low as 1.1 "if and only
if" the contractor could prove that the company's current assets were
of high liquidity. Some factors which affect the liquidity of a firm
are : (23)
1) "Faster turnover in receivables"
2) "Prompt billings *' - reduces turnover time
3) "Careful buying of inventories"
4) "Rapid completion of jobs to get retainage"
5) "Defer payment of current liabilities"
a) Helps to build up working capital
b) Reduces need for working capital
One surety stated that if contractors wish to increase their working
capital, they could simply borrow money from a financial institution.
This would increase their current assets as well as their long term
liabilities which are not included in the determination of the working
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capital or current ratio. Another option given, might be to have the
contractors sell some of their long term assets such as equipment.
This would increase his current assets with favorable results from
both the working capital and current ratio view points.
Unfortunately, the operating costs would go up as equipment would
have to be rented, probably at a premium.
By taking the values of the current ratios given by the surety
representatives and comparing them to the range of values found on
Table - 12 of Appendix A, it can be seen that the two compare
favorably. In like manner, other ratio values may be compared:
No. of
Ratios Responses Surety Responses D &B
Current Ratio (7) 1.2 to 2.0 1.3 to 2.8
Net Profit / Sales (5) 3 - 5% 0.5 - 7.2 %
Net Sales / W.C. (4) 15 - 20 to 1 6 - 21 to 1
Insufficient data was received from the sureties to make meaningful
comparisons between the other ratios. The sureties stated that too
many variables went into making up the ratios to give any set
statistics.
in response to the study, once the various ratios have been
determined for a particular firm they may be plotted on a table,
similar to Table-8, to show how they compare with the norm. During
the initial portion of the study, a table was found which had tabulated
the Key Business Ratios of different firms including some
construction firms. It is believed that this Table was constructed in
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the late 70's and for illustration purposes the year 1978 was used.
For the construction firms, the following values were indicated:
Current Profit Profit Sales CD. T.D.
Company Ratio Sales W.C. W.C. N.W. N.W.
(times) % % (times) % %
Fluor 1.3 5.9 32.1 16 42 17
McDermit 1.82 3.0 11.0 3.6 84 245
Dillingham 1.44 8.9 29.0 12.4 36 60
W.C. - Working Capital CD. - Current Debt
N.W. - New Worth T.D. - Total Debt
These Values were then graphed on a Table similar to Table 8 and
may be found as Tables 1 3- 1 5 in Appendix A. The information plotted
is for some of the larger construction firms, so extreme values
should be logically anticipated.
The L oss Ratio
One means by which a surety"s performance may be assessed is
through the evaluation of their loss ratio. In assessing the loss ratio,
three items must be addressed. The "direct premiums written", the
"direct premiums earned", and the "direct losses incurred". Each time
the surety executes the contract bonds, the contractor pays a
premium for the bond which is based on the contract amount. This
rate is usually about 1% of the contract price. In actuality, the
premium may be based on a varying rate structure depending on the
size of the job. (See Appendix C for surety rates). The sum of all
bond premiums added together is referred to as "the direct premiums
written". These premiums are collected "up front", but as yet, have
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not been earned. The surety "earns" an equal percentage of the
premium each month until the job is completed. If a contract price is
$240,000 and has a completion time of 24 months, assuming a bonding
rate of 1%, the direct premium written will be $240,000 x (1%) =
$2400 (the bond premium). The premium "earned" each month will be
$2400/24 = $100. The direct losses incurred is the amount the surety
company would have to pay out during a given year due to contractor
default- and their "bonds" being called upon. With these terms in
mind, the loss ratio may be defined as the "direct losses incurred"/
"direct premiums earned". Over the past few years, the average loss
ratio for sureties in the United States have been in the range of 30 to
45 Percent while those for the State of Washington have been more
erratic. (See Appendix C for more information).
Accounting Techniques
The sureties were asked to comment on the two types of accounting
methods that are in present use. These are the
percentage-of-completion method and the completed-contract
method. The percent of completion method is preferred "when
estimates of costs to complete and extent of progress toward
completion of long term contracts are reasonably dependable ". The
completed contract method is preferred when " lack of dependable
estimates or inherent hazards cause forecasts to be doubtful ".
The purpose of the "percentage of completion" method is to
recognize income as the work progresses and preferably when the
cost estimates are reasonably dependable. In this way, income may
be spread more evenly over more than one taxable period. The main
disadvantage with this method lies in the ability to accurately
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determine the percent of the work which has been completed. In
addition to periodically recognizing income, the percentage of
completion method focuses on economic activity as it reflects the
financial position of the contractor. By evaluating the status of each
job on a regular basis, management tends to play a more significant
role. As the sureties have pointed out, anything which can help to
establish the financial position of a firm and increase management
participation can have only positive benefits.
The purpose of the "completed contract" method is to recognize
income only when the contract is completed. This method is
preferable when estimates are doubtful or when there are inherent
hazards in the work undertaken. However, the main consideration
leading to the use of this method are its tax advantages. It has the
advantage, particularly for a contractor starting in business, of
complete deferral of all taxes until after the job is completed. Thus,
in the meantime, the taxable portion of the income is available for
working capital. The main disadvantage as far as the sureties are
concerned, is that this method does not reflect the financial status of
the contractor until the project is near completion.
In order to bridge the advantages which each method offers, some
companies keep two sets of books. For tax purposes the completed
contracts method is employed for all jobs, while the percentage of
completion method is used for internal cost control. If it is not
advantageous for a company to combine the two methods, the sureties
tend to favor "the percent of completion" method, as it provides them




With the alarming statistics on the growing number of construction
company failures and the tremendous liabilities which follow, the
sureties have been forced into requiring stricter underwriting
criteria. Examples of these are listed below:
a) Requiring more disclosure of information on financial statements.
This includes statements such as the status on uncompleted work and
the balance sheet, the income statement, and the statement of
changes in financial position. These forms allow the surety to
determine the contractors financial position and thus play a very
important role in determining the bonding capacity of the contractor.
These types of reports are now being required on a more regular basis.
b) Sureties tend to require life insurance policies on the principal
and key personnel of the firm. Should tragedy strike, the money may
be used to help the company cope with its sudden loss.
c) Sureties have required CPA "audits" to be performed more often.
With a third party involved, this helps ensure that the financial data
presented is true and correct. With this information in hand, the
financial position of a contractor will be able to be determined more
accurately. For intermediate reports, the sureties are requiring CPA
"reviews" more often, with less emphasis on "compilation reports".
d) Sureties are now requiring more breakdown on "job detail". With
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a better understanding of which disciplines are involved, i.e.,
mechanical, electrical, civil, etc., the sureties are in a better
position to determine whether the contractors have the required skill
or if they are "barking up the wrong tree". Obviously, contractors who
are not proficient in a particular area should sub out the work to
those who are fully qualified.
e) From a slightly different perspective, more bonds are being
written for subcontractors. Previously, should subcontractors become
insolvent or fail to pay their bills, the responsibility fell upon the
general contractor. By requiring surety bonds from subcontractors,
the general contractor receives the protection needed in the event
the subcontractor fails. This will help keep the job moving with
minimum delay.
Though only a few sureties will bond companies with less than 3 to
5 years of experience, it is not out of animosity but rather self
protection. Since sureties are set up on a no loss principal, the
underwriters must use extreme care to ensure that they will not find
themselves locked into a bond which may be called upon. Though
young construction firms have had a higher rate of failure in the last
few years, according to Dun & Bradstreet, the failure rate has begun
to pretty evenly divide itself between companies 3 to 5 years of age,
6 to 10 years of age, and 10 years or more. Reasons for these failures
are not present in each and every case and reasons for failure may
depend on which age range they happen to occur in. For instance,
while lack of experience and management skills may hurt the younger
contractor, desire to expand too quickly or take on too many jobs may
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be the down fall of those in the 6 to 10 group. What can take down a
business that has weathered more than 10 years? Changes in market
needs, changes in key personnel and getting involved in business
ventures that are outside their fields of expertise. Contractors can
succeed if they are willing to grow slow, select their jobs and
associates with caution, give themselves a chance to gain experience
and work with the sureties, trusting their analytical and judgmental
skills, even if they reject a bond at a particular time.
The three types of construction bonds, the bid bond, the performance
bond, and the payment bond, were discussed and the advantages or
coverage each provided was noted in detail. In order to prepare a
contractor contemplating application for a bond, the record
requirements and what a reviewing agent would be checking for were
discussed. In general, the bid bond may be obtained if the contractor
possesses the three C's of credit. Namely, character, capacity and
capital. The willingness of contractors to back their company by
personally indemnifying against losses, that the surety might be
forced to take on their account, is viewed in high regard.
To ensure the success of its no loss policy, the surety carefully
monitors the contractors situation prior to issuance of any bonds.
Any warning signs which may have developed since the last bond was
issued are examined in detail to see what effect they might have on
the contractor's performance. The bond may be refused should the
surety determine that it would not be in the contractor's best
interest to take on additional work at that time.
During the various phases of information gathering, minor
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differences were found to exist between printed material and what is
practiced in the field. Dun & Bradstreet pointed out that
approximately 32 - 35 % of construction firms which fail have been in
business less than 5 years. The sureties, however stated that they
feel a more realistic range would be 40 - 50 percent. This was based
on what they have seen over the past few years. A second discrepancy
was that most printed material mentioned that the old "10% rule" is
no longer in use. What this meant was that the working capital should
be approximately 10% of the bonding capacity. By examining the
questionnaires received from this study and the information passed
on during personal interviews, it appears that a number of the
sureties still use this principal as a guideline. Adjustments are then




The criteria used to evaluate contractors Is both subjective and
objective. The criteria is objective in the sense that all sureties
recognize the need
:
a) to evaluate and verify financial data
b) to review other work being performed and work previously
completed
c) to determine whether sufficient funding will be available to meet
the contract terms and to examine the contract provisions.
The criteria is subjective in that the honesty, integrity and
willingness of contractors to stand behind their companies are
assessed as well. If underwriters only required financial data for
their determinations of whether or not to bond a contractor, it would
not be long before someone developed a "software" package that
would simply prompt the user to enter the appropriate value(s) and,
in return, perform the analysis. There would be no human element, no
room for human error, it would simply base its decisions on the hard
"cold facts". Today however, it is only after the contractor's
character has been assessed as acceptable, and after the company's
capacity and capital have been determined adequate, that the surety
will determine whether the contractor represents a "low risk" or not.
This should indicate that the chance of a contractor default is small.
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The ratio analysis showed that both the current ratio and the working
capital/work on hand ratio, were of key importance. The meaning of
the current ratio, when examined alone, holds very little value and
should therefore be accompanied by working capital.
Young contractors and seasoned contractors tend to be evaluated on
the same criteria, but with different emphasis placed on items
relevant to each The surety can examine the seasoned contractors
track record and see what type of performance has been observed in
the past. With a young contractor, a performance trend is not yet
available due to the limited time they have been in business. Though
the surety will examine the young contractor's record with prior
employer(s), the evaluation favors the track record. Contractors
assume a much greater risk when they become the owner and the final
decision maker for all aspects of an organization. This is one lesson
many young contractors have yet to learn and this makes them a
greater risk. To help offset their lack of experience, the sureties rely
more on the young contractors financial strength and management
expertise, giving these areas more weight in their prequalification
evaluations.
The concept of personal indemnification has little differentiation
when comparing practices concerning the young contractors with
those of the more seasoned ones. The concept is not based on factors
such as the dollar size of the job or work program, but is simply
dependent on the contractor's willingness to stand behind the
company at all times. It is only equitable that a contractor be willing
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to financially back that company for which a bond guarantee is being
sought. A contractor cannot expect to enjoy full opportunities for
gain and expect the surety to bear the entire risk of loss alone. With
this in mind, the owners feel that contractors will perform more
dependably and cautiously if the activities of their company are
guided by the full knowledge that their personal assets will be
endangered if they become careless or lackadaisical. One surety
representative stated, "the element of character, one of the prime C's
of credit analysis, becomes vitally important. The willingness of the
contractors to stand behind their companies and support them with
their personal assets is a very important consideration to a surety.
In a sense, the contractor is asked to "put his money where his mouth
is", and he should view it in that light".
A contractor's financial responsibility when undertaking a new
contract is very important . The contractor must be able to finance
the contract from the start, provide the needed equipment and meet
first payroll deadlines. From that point on, the company's financial
responsibility is bound to the question of whether the contract price
is adequate to meet its obligations. It is the adequacy of the contract
price, much more than the wealth of the contractor at the beginning
of the project, that determines the profit or loss on the job and its
final financial results. Few contractors are wealthy enough to stand
a heavy loss and still complete their contract without calling on their
co-partner, the surety company. This is the fundamental reason that
sureties pay such close attention to the bids on construction work.
As this study has pointed out, all sureties question any bid which is
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more than 10% below the next low bidder. The sureties would prefer
to have a minimum of 3 bids in close proximity to the lowest bid.
This becomes more and more important as the number of bidders
increase.
The purpose of this study was to examine the surety profession as
it related to the application for and receipt of contract bonds. Since
there are young contractors who know very little about the bonding
side of the construction business, they may approach the underwriter
with both reservation and even a bit of fear. To alleviate these
feelings, the contractor must first become familiar with what the
prequalification process entails and how it is implemented. In
understanding these concepts, it is believed that the contractors will
approach their underwriter with more confidence, knowing in advance
what is to be expected of them.
The focus of this paper deals with the different components that
makeup the prequalification process. It gives a number of insights
into those areas which sureties judge to be most critical. By
carefully examining the contents of this report, contractors may be
able to obtain sufficient knowledge to enable them to not only
recognize their bonding needs, but also lessen the anxiety that may
accompany application for those bonds .
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After examining the facts which came from this study concerning
contract bonding and reasons leading to contract failures, the
following recommendations are set forth for consideration and
possible implementation.
Cooperation is essential when applying for contract bonds. Unless
sureties are provided with all the pertinent facts they will be unable
to ascertain the contractor's true financial position. If the surety is
working from an erroneous data base, the contractor's bonding limit
may be set higher or lower than is appropriate. Setting it too low
will prevent contractors from taking on work which they could
adequately handle. Conversely, some contractors may feel that a
higher bonding limit will work to their advantage in that it will
enable them to take on additional work. Although this is true, the
rationale shows a lack of character on the part of the contractor. By
placing the surety into a potentially precarious financial position,
which contractors know they are not entitled to, can lead to serious
problems in the future for both contractor and surety. By taking on
more work than the contractor is capable of handling, the seeds of
overextension are sown.
Young contractors should ensure that the individuals who have been
trained in "managerial skills" play a vital role in the organization of
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the firm. Having the necessary technicians and know how will not
guarantee that a company will function properly and cost effectively.
There must be those who can properly manage both people and all
operation associated with the contract field.
The associates of any contractors should be chosen with extreme
care. Contractors may become vulnerable if they fall under the
influence of support personnel that claim expertise in a field where
none is truly held. The positions which seem to require the greatest
areas of concern were those of superintendents and estimators. Other
support positions that need to be held by those proficient in their
fields, are those of engineer, attorney, partner and accountant. The
attorney should have experience and/or training specifically in the
area of construction. The partner should have both experience and
financial resources to make the partnership equally beneficial for all
parties involved. The accountant should meet the criteria that has
been set forth in this paper. Only a few accountants are
acknowledged as being qualified to deal with all of aspects that the
construction field requires. Establishment of a "solid support system"
provides the contractors with the confidence and ability to place a
bid. By knowing that the estimating has been correctly performed,
that the contracts will be signed only when correct, and that the
projects will be adequately supervised, the contractors can rest
assured in the knowledge that their records are being handled in the
manner required by the industry.
New contractors should not attempt to take on jobs of the same
magnitude that they were responsible for while serving under the
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title of superintendent or foreman elsewhere. Serving as owner
instead of superintendent carries a great amount of responsibility and
requires more indepth analysis of the internal workings of the
company. This, coupled with the idea that all final decisions rest
with the owner, should stress the need to start small and grow as
experience is gained.
Should contractors decide to expand their horizons, they should only
consider those fields of work which closely reflect the type of work
now being performed. This will enable them to utilize their existing
personnel and equipment without having to completely retrain or
make major new equipment purchases. Whenever new work of
substantial magnitude is to be undertaken, it may prove beneficial to
form a joint venture with a contractor that has "proven himself" in
the line of business under consideration. This allows the
inexperienced contractor to spend more time learning from the
experienced contractor, as less time will have to be devoted to every
aspect of the job. The experienced contractor may already have the
required equipment thereby eliminating the necessity of having to
rent or purchase any additional equipment. If the contractor prefer to
remain independent, the dollar size and the complexity of the task
should be taken into account. If contractors usually bid jobs in the
range of 1 to 2 million, they should not expect to bid a job of the same
magnitude in a field in which they are not fully qualified. Contractors
should start at the lower end of the monetary spectrum and work
their way up as they gain both managerial and technical experience.
When work requires contractors to leave their "familiar"
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surroundings, whether domestic of foreign, there are certain factors
which must be considered. The contractor can not rely strictly on
those costs they normally would have had if the job was in the
contractor's own backyard. Labor rates must be adjusted to reflect
the rates prevalent in the new area of work. Cost multipliers may
have to be utilized to represent differential costs which exist among
materials depending on where they are bought. It may also be wise to
employ some "locals", or resistance from within the community may
result. Only by examining each area in careful detail will the
transition from home territory to unfamiliar job site territory
proceed smoothly.
Good bidding practices are essential for a company which has the
intention of growing and prospering. All contractors should use
extreme care when preparing their bids. This ensures that all areas of
work have been considered. This includes the categories of:
mobilization/demobilization, overhead expenses, contingencies, etc.
Perhaps the best means of ensuring completeness is through the use
of comprehensive checklists. Since putting a bid together requires a
great deal of time and forethought, bidding on numerous jobs in a
limited time span should be avoided. Rushing through a bid usually
allows room for omissions to occur. To compound the issue, should
the contractor be awarded the job, the contractor would be starting a
job which already has a built in loss factor. This type of error
,
carries a much greater impact than it did a number of years ago. With
increased competition contractors no longer have the large profit
margins in their bids. Today, they find themselves having to use a
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"very fine" pencil to arrive at their bids. Since there are smaller
profit margins, errors of this nature become critical. Once the profit
margin is used up, there is but one source for the contractor draw
upon, "his own pocket book". If a contractor was the low bidder, due
to omissions that can be proven, the contractor should strongly
consider withdrawing the bid. By not doing so, the contractor is
placed into a no win situation. In addition, this can preclude
contractors from bidding on other jobs in which they might stand to
make a profit.
Recommendations For Further Study.
While trying to determine those areas in which contractors will be
evaluated by the sureties, the researcher drew entirely on
information received from the conventional surety market. Though
these clearly dominate the profession, there are specialty firms
which deal nearly in all cases with bonds which are unacceptable to
the conventional commercial markets. A study which would delve
into this subject would provide the reasons why some surety
companies write bonds when others decline to do so. By comparing
the two studies, a deeper understanding of the overall workings of the
surety business could be obtained.
This study represents the viewpoint of the surety industry only and
did not attempt to take into account the expectations a contractor has
when approaching the underwriter. A study of this nature could prove
very beneficial to both parties. By having a synopsis of how the
sureties function, as well as, what contractors feel are the most
significant factors leading to issuance of a bond, conclusions and
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recommendations could be drawn. This would help facilitate the
interface between these two parties which rely heavily upon one
another for their continued existence.
Management plays a vital role in ensuring the longevity of a
construction firm. Any study focusing on measures to curtail the
likelihood of a failure, which is management-oriented, would prove
extremely helpful. Some areas which could be investigated, would be:
a) proper bidding techniques, b) cost control studies
,
c) signs of
overextension and d) observance of warning signs With adequate
knowledge and ability to perform these functions, perhaps
"management" would no longer play such a significant role in
construction failures.
All sureties indicated that "ratio analysis" comprises an important
role in helping them determine the financial position of a contractor.
Though no one single value for a given ratio is right or wrong there
are ranges associated with each one that the surety would like to see
obtained. An indepth analysis of these ratios would allow a greater
understanding of why certain limits have been established and why it
is so important that they be met. It would also be of interest, to
approach both the contractors and accountants and get their
respective viewpoints on how they see the "ratio analysis" fitting
into the scheme of things. Their suggestions as to what values they
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COMPMOSOM) T© KEV (DOHSOIMESS KATII09«
INDUSTRY GENERAL BUILDIN6 CONTRACTORS
CURRENT PROFIT PROFIT SALES CURRENT DEBT TOTAL DEBT
RATIO SALES WORKING WORKING NET WORTH NET WORTH
CAPITAL CAPITAL
(times) (%) (%) (times) (%) (%)
A 2.02 3.08 36.63 22.28 69.3 105.4
B 1.54 1.53 17.43 13.43 133.1 202.8
.24 0.74 9.17 6.61 229.6 320.2
A) UPPER QUART I LE RANGE
B) INDUSTRY MEDIAN
C) LOWER QUART I LE RANGE




aMUPAROSODG T© QCEV DHD90K1ES9 KATril03<
INDUSTRY: 6ENERAL BUILDING CONTRACTORS
CURRENT PROFIT PROFIT SALES CURRENT DEBT TOTAL DEBT
RATIO SALES WORKING WORKING NET WORTH NET WORTH
CAPITAL CAPITAL
(times) (%) (%) (times) (%) (%)
A 1.83 2.39 27.77 26.32 84.5 115.8
B 1.42 1.07 16.39 13.1 1 151.3 195.0
1.20 0.48 6.70 8.72 231.6 275.9
A) UPPER QUART I LE RANGE
B) INDUSTRY MEDIAN
C) LOWER QUART I LE RANGE






COMPAKQSOBO T® KEY BU3UKIE33 KATTIIOS"
INDUSTRY: GENERAL BUILDING CONTRACTORS
CURRENT PROFIT PROFIT SALES CURRENT DEBT TOTAL DEBT
RATIO SALES WORKING WORKING NET WORTH NET WORTH
CAPITAL CAPITAL
(times) (%) (%) (times) (%) (%)
B
1.77 2.96 42.16 24.43 73.5 123.9
1.43 1.13 16.67 15.02 133.8 234.0
.23 0.44 7.07 8.19 235.6 388.9
A) UPPER QUARTILE RANGE
B) INDUSTRY MEDIAN
C) LOWER QUARTILE RANGE






ODMIPAQMSOQfl TO QCEV DySOBQESS KATQ(DS»
INDUSTRY: GENERAL BUILDING CONTRACTORS
CURRENT PROFIT PROFIT SALES CURRENT DEBT TOTAL DEBT
RATIO SALES WORKING WORKING NET WORTH NET WORTH
CAPITAL CAPITAL
(times) (%) (%) (times) (%) (%)
A 2.24 2.80 29.16 19.46 53.6 105.4
B 1.54 1.50 14.86 10.60 116.2 196.1
.27 0.56 5.64 4.74 202.6 302.8
A) UPPER QUART I LE RANGE
B) INDUSTRY MEDIAN
C) LOWER QUART I LE RANGE
«AS PUBLI SHED BY DUM & BRADSTREET FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 1 1 , 1 Q76
Table-7

COMPAOtOSON T® KEV DdDSODOESS KATTOOS"
INDUSTRY: GENERAL BUILDIN6 CONTRACTORS
CURRENT PROFIT PROFIT SALES CURRENT DEBT TOTAL DEBT
RATIO SALES WORKING WORKING NET WORTH NET WORTH
CAPITAL CAPITAL
(times) (%) (%) (times) (%) (%)
A 2.72 5.24 43.20 18.52 35.4 84.4
B 1.63 1.87 20.08 1 1.26 120.7 136.8
.38 0.62 8.37 4.79 216.3 275.1
A) UPPER QUART I LE RANGE
B) INDUSTRY MEDIAN
C) LOWER QUART I LE RANGE





COMIPAIRIISO&Q TO KEV IBilDSQ&OESS 35^T0©S»








CURRENT DEBT TOTAL DEBT
NET WORTH NET WORTH
(times) (%) (%) (times) (%) (%)
A 2.57 6.11 ** 19.68 35.4 48.1
B 1.61 2.94 ** 10.69 97.3 118.6
.25 .25 ** 5.08 205.6 244.8
A) UPPER QUARTILE RANGE
B) INDUSTRY MEDIAN
C) LOWER QUARTILE RANGE







COMPARISON TO KEV RODS MESS RATQOS»







CURRENT DEBT TOTAL DEBT
NET WORTH NET WORTH
(times) (%) (%) (%)
A 2.54 6.63 ** 18.89 40.0 53.85
B 1.58 3.22 ** 10.26 106.7 129.05
.24 .48 ** 4.94 217.35 254.6
A) UPPER QUART I LE RANGE
B) INDUSTRY MEDIAN
C) LOWER QUART I LE RANGE







OMIIPAOIIISOIM T® QCEV DIUS90OESS RATII©S«








CURRENT DEBT TOTAL DEBT
NET WORTH NET WORTH
(times) (%) (%) (%)
A 2.75 7.75 ** 20.9 33.2 47.3
B 1.60 3.15 ** 11.3 91.9 114.6
** 6.1 98.5 233.
A) UPPER QUARTILE RANGE
B) INDUSTRY MEDIAN
C) LOWER QUARTILE RANGE







COMPARISON T® KEV i&ASQIMESS RATTQ0S"








CURRENT DEBT TOTAL DEBT
NET WORTH NET WORTH
(times) (%) (%) (times) (%) (%)
A 2.80 7.20 ** 21.4 29.2 41.6
B 1.70 2.60 ** 11.2 82.2 102.9
1.30 0.50 ** 5.9 80.6 215.8
A) UPPER QUART I LE RANGE
B) INDUSTRY MEDIAN
C) LOWER QUART I LE RANGE








COMPMOSO&Q T(D KEV HUSO NESS flMTTII©S«
INDUSTRY GENERAL BUILDING CONTRACTORS
FLUOR COMPANY
CURRENT PROFIT PROFIT SALES CURRENT DEBT TOTAL DEBT
RATIO SALES WORKING WORKING NET WORTH NET WORTH
CAPITAL CAPITAL
(times) (%) (%) (times) (%) (%)
^~~& P?.o













20.08 11.26 120.7 136.8
/
.38' 0.62 8.37 4.79 216.3 275.
6>-30
A) UPPER QUART I LE RANGE
B) INDUSTRY MEDIAN
C) LOWER QUART I LE RANGE






ODMIPAIRDSO0O T® KEV DdDSOMESS RAT OS*
INDUSTRY GENERAL BU/LDING CONTRACTORS
McDERMIT COMPANY
CURRENT PROFIT PROFIT SALES CURRENT DEBT TOTAL DEBT
RATIO SALES WORKING W0RKIN6 NET WORTH NET WORTH
CAPITAL CAPITAL
(times) (%) (%) (times) (%) (%)
A 2.72 5.24 43.20 18.52 35.4 84.4
Or <\ ^
B 1.63 1.87 \ 20.08 11.26 /1 20.7 \ 136.8
^ 7* ^
C 1.38 0.62 8.37 \ 4.79/ 216.3 275.1
A) UPPER QUARTILE RANGE
B) INDUSTRY MEDIAN
C) LOWER QUARTILE RANGE




COMPAilKISODO TO KEV (MJI9QNES9 KATTI10S*




































1.87 20.08 11.26 120.7 136.8B
6
C 1.38 0.62 8.37 4.79 216.3 275.1
A) UPPER QUARTILE RANGE
B) INDUSTRY MEDIAN
C) LOWER QUARTILE RANGE
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